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I. INTRODUCTION
All over the world, the spirit of human rights is moving-as the
waters cover the sea. Human rights language has become universal, spo-
ken both by political leaders and ordinary citizens, even if the former
sometimes use such language merely to cloak atrocious activities. Thus,
it may boldly-and truthfully-be claimed that this is the age of rights,2
as human rights have grown historically, geographically, and culturally
within the last few decades. Rights now matter to everyone because they
are universal, indivisible, and interdependent. Rights are accorded to
individuals and groups in order to enable them to realize their self-worth
and dignity, and to organize society in such a way that these goals are
effectuated and respected. Besides, international law strongly supports
2. See generally Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 13-14 (1990) (explaining that
governments only began looking at how other nations treat their people when the rights of
their own citizens were violated while abroad).
1210 [Vol. 24:1209
Articulating the Right
"the imperative to understand and accept that human rights matter for
",3
everyone.
Partly, but largely, because of human rights, citizens of nation-states
are increasingly becoming aware of the roles they should play in nation
building and of the structures they should give to their societies. Citizen
silence in matters of governance is no longer golden. In Africa, as indeed
elsewhere, individuals and movements are increasingly challenging au-
thoritarian regimes, forcing them to pander to popular demands for
political pluralism. All this was not so in the classical, post-Peace of
Westphalia international law era, the era of positivism when the sover-
eign will of a State was the be all and end all. Under classical
international law, "[w]hat states actually do was the key, not what states
ought to do given basic rules of the law of nature."
Things are different now, particularly in this age of globalization-
"a new context for and a new connectivity among economic actors and
activities throughout the world."5 In this brave new world, the character
of State sovereignty has been significantly altered.6 The international
community has jettisoned-or is prepared to jettison-outworn and
outmoded doctrines, such as the domain reserve of States. Human rights
are no longer solely a matter of domestic concern.
3. See Ronald Wilson, Why Human Rights Matter for Everyone, 3 E LAW-MURDOCH
U. ELECTRONIC J.L. 3 (1996), available at http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v3n3/
wilson.html.
4. MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (4th ed. 1997).
5. KOFi ANNAN, 'WE THE PEOPLES': THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE 2 IST
CENTURY 9 (2000) ("The benefits of globalization are plain to see: faster economic growth,
higher living standards, accelerated innovation and diffusion of technology and management
skills, new economic opportunities for individuals and countries."). See generally Nsongurua
Udombana, How Should We Then Live? Globalization and the New Partnership for Africa's
Development, 20 BOSTON UNIV. INT'L L.J. 293 (2002) (examining the impact of globalization
on Africa and arguing for normative and institutional reforms, both at the international and
national levels, in order for the goals of the New Partnership for Africa's Development to
succeed); Tony Evans & Jan Hancock, Doing Something Without Doing Anything: Interna-
tional Human Rights Law and the Challenge of Globalisation, 2 INT'L J. HUM. RTS., Autumn
1998, at 1. Contra Leo Panitch, Rethinking the Role of the State, in GLOBALIZATION: CRITI-
CAL REFLECTIONS 83, 85 (James H. Mittelman ed., 1996) (arguing that rather than the central
actors in global politics, States are "the authors of a regime that defines and guarantees,
through international treaties with constitutional effect, the global and domestic rights of capi-
tal.").
6. See L. ALl KHAN, THE EXTINCTION OF NATION-STATES: A WORLD WITHOUT BOR-
DERS (1996) (discussing the demise of the nation-state as the prime organizational unit of
society and as the central subject of international law).
7. See, e.g., Annan Backs Individuals Over State, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2001), at
http:/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/1701605.stm (declaring "the sovereignty of states
must no longer be used as a shield for gross violations of human rights" and trumpeting the
need to concentrate on individual rights); cf Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of
the Organization: An Agenda for Peace, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 17, U.N. Doc. S/241 11
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Of course, international law is still concerned with the protection of
sovereignty. It has to be, for, as Wolfgang Friedman observed many
years ago, "states are the repositories of legitimated authority over peo-
ples and territories. It is only in terms of state powers, prerogatives,
jurisdictional limits and law-making capabilities that territorial limits
and jurisdiction, responsibility for official actions, and a host of other
questions of co-existence between nations can be determined."'
While Friedmann's observation is still poignantly true today, it could
be said, with equal force, that "the realities of international relations are
not reducible to a simple formula and the picture is somewhat complex."9
In any case, the object of international law's protection is now different.
International law is no longer the power base of a tyrant who rules di-
rectly by naked power or through the apparatus of a totalitarian political
order. Its object of protection, in modern times, is the continuing capac-
ity of a population to express and affect choices freely about the
identities and policies of its governors.
The one fundamental fact that has emerged is the significance of the
individual before the international community. This has led States to be-
come their brothers' keepers, inquiring, for example, into how each is
treating its citizens. Therefore, while the powers of national governments
are still growing in some respects, their capacity to exercise authority has
been considerably reduced in others.
This Article articulates the right to democratic governance in Africa,
arguing that democratic entitlement ought to acquire, if indeed it already
has not acquired, a degree of legitimacy in the continent. If democratic
governance is a fundamental human right, which this Article asserts it is, it
follows that any African State that denies its citizens the right to any of the
elements of democratic entitlement-such as free and open elections-is
violating a fundamental right, which should attract responsibility. The Ar-
ticle begins with an examination of the patrimonial State structure in
Africa and its negative impact on governance. It is a chronicle of wasted
years. It goes on to discuss the unsettled question of democratic entitle-
ment in modern international law but asserts the existence of such a
right. It examines the normative framework of democratic governance in
Africa, including United Nations-inspired human rights instruments to
which African States are parties. How far have the African intergovern-
mental organizations, in particular the African Union (AU) (formerly the
(1992) (Boutros Boutros Ghali) (stating that "the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty
... has passed").
8. WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 213
(1964).
9. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 (5th ed. 1998).
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Organization of African Unity (OAU))' ° encouraged transitions to de-
mocracy? This Article answers this question by examining the various
regional instruments and action plans relating to democratic governance
in Africa. It also considers the superstructures that the AU should erect
on the infrastructures of democratic governance in order to create beauti-
ful democratic edifices in Africa, capable of shielding Africans from the
monstrosities and buffooneries of power.
II. STATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA
This Part looks at the patrimonial States in Africa and how these
have affected the development or lack of development of democratic and
other human rights norms in the continent. It, however, offers hope that
there is a silver lining in the present dark cloud of imperfect transition to
democracy in Africa.
A. Neopatrimonial States
Postcolonial African States have strived to fashion themselves in the
image of Western liberalism with little success. Too frequently, they have
succumbed to authoritarian, usually military, rule." The primary reason
for this failure has been that the Western liberal conception of States and
democracy does not fit in Africa. The term "Modern State" is usually
used to illustrate Western political philosophy that conceives government
as comprised of three independent organs-the legislature, the executive,
and the judiciary-functioning within a territory that is unambiguously
defined.'2 Similarly, the Western multiparty system presumes the exis-
tence of a Modern State, a fully functioning civil society, and a free
press, with "organic" constitutions grounded on the soil and clearly de-
fining the powers, rights, and responsibilities of all participants.
State creation in Africa differs markedly from this Western proto-
type. States did not evolve in Africa. Colonial masters imposed them on
the population, creating the territories that became modern day Africa.
10. The African Union (AU) was inaugurated in Durban, South Africa on July 9, 2002
replacing the Organization of African Unity (OAU). See Constitutive Act of African Union,
July 11, 2000, art. 33(1), 8 AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 479,494 (2000) [hereinafter AU Act].
11. See Okechukwu Oko, Consolidating Democracy on a Troubled Continent: A Chal-
lenge for Lawyers in Africa, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 575, 577 (2000) (arguing that "[tlhe
gyration from democracy to authoritarianism has left most African nations in deep turmoil as
no African government has significantly advanced the welfare of its citizens").
12. See Jackton Ojwang, Legal Transplantation: Rethinking the Role and Significance
of Western Law in Africa, in LEGAL PLURALISM: PROCEEDINGS OF THE CANBERRA LAW
WORKSHOP VII 99 (Peter Sack & Elizabeth Minchin eds., 1986).
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The boundaries of most African states do not coincide with the geo-
graphic divisions of ethnic groups.'3 What are today called "Modern
States" are nothing but "imagined communities,"'" where "the members
of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives
the image of their communion."'5
Colonialism did not endeavor to bring democracy to Africa. Colonial-
ism, was "the cradle of contemporary forms of fragmentation in Africa,"
though some have argued that the colonial state weaved these "forms of
fragmentation from the material that the pre-existing, pre-colonial sets of
identities and relationships" provided. 6 A typical colonial state in Africa
was a partisan leviathan, 7 concentrating all the social goods in its hands
and establishing a political and administrative structure that was "rooted in
authoritarianism and ethnic divisions, widespread illiteracy, and extreme
marginalization of African peoples."' 8 It subverted hitherto traditional
structures, institutions, and values, or made them subservient to the eco-
nomic and political needs of the imperial powers.'9 It introduced
centrally directed but uneven development.
2°
The coercive and exploitative character of colonial African states
"effectively trumped [their] ability to secure genuine widespread
allegiance among the majority African population."'" Unfortunately,
when direct colonialism ended, it did not address, let alone resolve, the
allocation of power in a multicultural state, pieced together by former
colonial rulers. The transition to independence offered African states a
rare opportunity for radical restructuring along the democratic path.
Unfortunately, the departing colonial overlords left the reins of power in
the hands of tiny and educated, but highly egotistic, conceited, and self-
13. See ANTHONY D. SMITH, NATIONAL IDENTITY: ETHNONATIONALISM IN COMPARA-
TIVE PERSPECTIVE 15 (Walker Connor ed., 1991).
14. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 16 (1992) (explaining that a nation
is always "a deep horizontal comradeship," notwithstanding the actual inequality and hierar-
chy that may prevail within it).
15. Id. at6.
16. See OBIORA CHINEDU OKAFOR, RE-DEFINING LEGITIMATE STATEHOOD: INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND STATE FRAGMENTATION IN AFRICA 98 (2000).
17. See Crawford Young, Ethnicity and the Colonial and Post-Colonial State in Africa,
in ETHNIC GROUPS AND THE STATE 61 (P. Brass ed., 1985).
18. Algiers Declaration, OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Gov't, 35th Ord. Sess.,
Res. AHG/Dec.I(XXXV), OAU Doc. DOC/OS(XXVI)INF.17a (1999) [hereinafter Algiers
Declaration].
19. E.g., id. (arguing that colonialism laid an economic infrastructure that was "geared
exclusively to satisfying the needs of the colonial metropolis").
20. See OKWUDIBA NNOLI, ETHNICITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA 20 (1995).
21. OKAFOR, supra note 16, at 99 (discussing the historical development of contempo-
rary forms of socio-cultural fragmentation within African States).
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seeking elite groups, who inherited the infrastructures that were designed
for economic extraction with no tradition of accountability to the
governed .
The failure to address the postcolonial power structure led to a re-
verse wave of democratization. Thus, soon after the "first liberation,
'
'
21
Africans discovered that postcolonial states were mere extensions of the
old system, with new methods of divide-and-rule. These states consti-
tuted realms of "free, arbitrary action and discretion of personally
motivated favor and valuation. 24 The inheritance elite controlled the bulk
of the resources available in the polity, and distributed it in a manner
that, like the colonial government, was anything but even.25 Public offi-
cials in these neopatrimonial settings began to serve particular interests
rather than the common good.26
Furthermore, Africa's elites did not have the capacity to maintain the
functions associated with national sovereignty in their territories, such as
the maintenance of the rule of law, regulation of borders, and provision
of social services. These problems were compounded by the fact that
these elites, having established and strengthened their desired political
kingdoms, began to systematically taunt and look down upon the poor
21people they were supposed to govern. Converts are sometimes more
zealous than those brought up in the faith. As states became enemies of
their citizens, harsh governments or primitive dictatorships became the
norm in Africa, with one dismal tyranny giving way to a worse one."
Postcolonial African states have remained colonial in their adherence to
generally anti-democratic and repressive measures and attitudes.
Whether in Uganda, Nigeria, Zaire (now Democratic Republic of
22. Paul Clements, Challenges for African States, 36 J. ASIAN & AFR. STUD. 295, 297
(2001) (writing also that struggles for independence did not provide the African political elites
with the training to manage economic development).
23. The so-called "first liberation" in Africa was the transition from colonial to inde-
pendent rule that swept the continent between 1957 and 1964, except in the south.
24. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY
979 (1978).
25. See Young, supra note 17, at 85.
26. See generally MICHAEL BRATTON & NICOLAS VAN DE WALLE, DEMOCRATIC Ex-
PERIMENTS IN AFRICA: REGIME TRANSITIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1997); THOMAS
M. CALLAGHY, THE STATE-SOCIETY STRUGGLE: ZAIRE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1984).
27. See CHINUA ACHEBE, ANTHILLS OF THE SAVANNAH 38 (1987) (describing the Kan-
gan struggle for a successful form of postcolonial self-government through the experience of
three friends who are intricately involved in the Kangan government). Achebe depicts the new
native government adopting the imperialist rhetoric for oppression of the poor. Id.
28. See BASIL DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN: AFRICA AND THE CURSE OF THE
NATION-STATE 9 (1992) (presenting an informed and concerned reflection on Africa's current
deep disappointments with the nation-state, exploring, inter alia, the wasted years of colonial-
ism).
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Congo), Kenya, Liberia, Togo, Malawi, Guinea, Mauritania, Equatorial
Guinea, Libya, Egypt, or Zimbabwe, the story has been that of a "decen-
tralized despotism," in which the subjects are trapped in a non-racial
version of apartheid. 9 It was as if these rulers were all acting from the
same script-a play in which a number of separate characters all turned
out to be the same character.
Multiparty systems were consolidated into single-party systems,
then into one-man systems and, sometimes, no system at all.3° Although
many African rulers justified one-party regimes on the need to maintain
unity "in the face of ethnic, linguistic, and cultural differences,"3' the
truth was that most of these leaders rejected opposition on other, mostly
selfish, grounds. "In Malawi, for example, the idea of opposition was
rejected on quasi-theological grounds: 'It]here is no opposition in
Heaven. God Himself does not want opposition-that is why he chased
Satan away. Why should Kamuzu (President Banda) have opposi-
tion?' ,32
Whatever was left of the balloon of democratic pretense in postcolo-
nial Africa was deflated by military coup d'etats, which malignantly
began in a few African countries in the early 1960s and, for several years
thereafter, metastasized throughout the body of the continent. Indeed,
between the Egyptian revolution in 1952 until 1998, Africa witnessed
eighty-five coups or unconstitutional changes in government, seventy-
eight of which took place between 1961 and 1997."3 The instability that
these regimes brought on Africa and its peoples is still evident today. For
example, military regimes weakened and, in some instances, destroyed
institutions needed to build democratic structures, such as the judiciary.
The military eroded the rule of law and independence of the judiciary
through such mechanisms as ouster clauses in decrees." Ouster clauses
29. See generally MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY AF-
RICA AND THE LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM (1996).
30. See Nsongurua Udombana, Can the Leopard Change Its Spots? The African Union
Treaty and Human Rights, 17 AM. UNIV. INT'L L. REV. 1177, 1218 (2002) [hereinafter Can
the Leopard Change Its Spots?] (offering a pessimistic assessment of the AU Treaty's prospect
of bringing about a paradigm shift in the poor human fights practices of African States).
31. JOHN KPUNDEH, DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA: AFRICAN VOICES, AFRICAN VIEWS
12 (1992). Other grounds used to justify one-party regimes included the alleged tradition of a
single unchallenged chief and the idea that a democratic majority is expressed through a single
party. See id.
32. KPUNDEH, supra note 31, at 12-13 (quoting Samuel Decalo, The Process, Pros-
pects and Constraints of Democratization in Africa, 91 AFR. AFF. 7, 10 (1992)).
33. See Momee van der Linde, Emerging Electoral Trends in the Light of Recent Afri-
can Elections, I AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 127, 128 (2001).
34. See generally B.O. NWABUEZE, MILITARY RULE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 18
(1992) (discussing the impact of military rule on civil and political fights, such as the erosion
1216 [Vol. 24:1209
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reflect a lack of confidence of the military in the justifiability of its ac-
tions. For example, in a petition of violation of human rights brought
before the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights against
the then military government of Nigeria,35 the Nigerian government of-
fered this stunning defense before the Commission: "[I]t is in the nature
of military regimes to provide for ouster clauses," because without such
clauses the volume of litigation would make it "too cumbersome for the
government to do what it wants to do."36
For many Africans, living under military regimes has been like living
in the land of monsters; indeed, African governments have "a great deal
in common with a group of gangsters,"37 with minimal exceptions.3" Re-
grettably, the erstwhile OAU existed in an ecstasy of indifference and,
therefore, could not arrest these trends towards omnipotence. Like the
biblical Pharisees-who loved sacrifices more than acts of mercy 39 -the
OAU guarded the noninterference principle of the OAU Charter ' more
than the protection of essential rights of the citizens that were repeatedly
being assaulted and violated by its members. Until its dissolution in July
of the rule of law, violations of personal liberty, interference with private property, denial of
the community's right to self-government, and restrictions on organized politics and other
associational rights).
35. See Communications 105/93, 128/94, 130/94, 152/96, Media Rights Agenda, Con-
stitutional Rights Project, Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria
[hereinafter Media Rights Agenda et al v. Nigeria], in TWELFTH ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT
OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS 1998-1999, A.U. Doc.
AHG/215 (XXXV), Annex V, available at http://www.achpr.org/12th-Annual-Activity-
Report-_AHG.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2003) [hereinafter TWELFTH ANNUAL ACTIVITY RE-
PORT].
36. ld. $ 78.
37. Andrew S. Levin, Civil Society and Democratization in Haiti, 9 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 389, 410 (1995) (quoting Francisco Weffort, Why Democracy?, in DEMOCRATIZING
BRAZIL 327, 342 (Alfred Stepan ed., 1989)). Ogaga Ifowodo, a civil rights activist in Nigeria,
has stated that "[g]overnments in most of Africa ... are committees of unfeeling beasts who
have no respect for the rule of law." N.J. Udombana, The Rule of Law and the Rule of Man in
a Military Dictatorship, in CURRENT THEMES IN NIGERIAN LAW 73 (1.0. Agbede & E.O.
Akanki eds., 1997) [hereinafter The Rule of Law] (examining the impact of military rule in
Nigeria on the rule of law and human rights).
38. Such as the late Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, former President Kenneth Kaunda of
Zambia, and, of course, Nelson Mandela of South Africa-leaders who are not known to have
enriched themselves through political office.
39. See Matthew 9:10-13 (recording Jesus' encounter with the Pharisees who had ac-
cused the former of eating with publicans and sinners; to which Jesus replied that "[t]hose
who are strong and well have no need of a physician, but those who are weak and sick ... I
desire mercy [that is, readiness to help those in trouble] and not sacrifice and sacrificial vic-
tims'") (emphasis added).
40. See CHARTER OF THE OAU, May 25, 1963, art. 111(2), 479 U.N.T.S. 39, 74 [herein-
after OAU CHARTER] (stating the principles of the OAU to include respect for sovereignty and
nonintervention in the internal affairs of Member States).
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2002, the OAU was an organization where not rocking the boat seemed
to have been genetically engineered into many of its members. The body
somewhat validated Reinhold Niebuhr's assertion that groups tend to be
more immoral than individuals.4'
In addition to poor leadership, corruption, and bad governance that
hampered the development of accountable and responsible governments
in Africa, there were also the contractions and contradictions of the Cold
War. The workings of the international system, especially the policies of
the superpowers during the Cold War era, complicated the process of
State making in Africa in two ways. Firstly, it encouraged totalitarian
tyrannies of both right and left; and, secondly, it accentuated insecurities
and instabilities in the continent. During the Cold War, the "warring"
parties were busy exporting superpower rivalry to Africa in the form of
interstate and intrastate proxy wars. They transferred weapons to
governments and insurgents in fragile polities within volatile
environments.4 '2 The criteria for the recognition of governments took little
account of whether regimes enjoyed a popular mandate. Corrupt and
clientelist regimes, like Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko or Kenya's Daniel Arap
Moi, were often able to gain financial aid from major powers-notably
the United States-anxious to retain their loyalties. It simply did not
bother these "godfathers" that these leaders were suffering from Acute
Integrity Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).
B. A New But Hazy Dawn
The good news is that democracy is gradually supplanting outworn
aristocratic and military regimes in Africa.4 3 The "roaring tide of
democracy has drowned the sound of the AK-47 which once announced
the arrival of yet another military 'liberator.' " Of course, regimes still
totter and fall; but even there, the wind of change blows where it wishes.
Africans can hear the sound of it, though they may not tell from where it
41. See REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY: A STUDY IN ETH-
ICS AND POLITICS (1932) (arguing that the larger the group within which we operate, the less
the power of sympathy, and thus the greater the distance between moral ideal and political
reality). According to Niebuhr, international relations, involving interactions among the largest
social group, stands at the pinnacle of immorality: "A perennial weakness of the moral life in
individuals is simply raised to the nth degree in national life." Id. at 107.
42. See MOHAMMED AYOOB, THE THIRD WORLD SECURITY PREDICAMENT: STATE
MAKING, REGIONAL CONFLICT, AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 93-95 (1995).
43. See E. Gyimah-Boadi, The Rebirth of African Liberalism, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr.
1998, at 18.
44. Dominic M. Ayine, Ballots as Bullets? Compliance with Rules and Norms Provid-
ing for the Right to Democratic Governance: An African Perspective, 10 AFR. J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 709, 709-10 (1998).
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comes and where it goes. In many African countries, "the ballot is
increasingly replacing the bullet as a means of attaining political power
and maintaining legitimacy.' 45 This "second liberation" began with an
historic multiparty election in Benin in 1991, in which the incumbent
president was defeated. It was replicated in Malawi and Zambia the
same year.46 Since the early 1990s, more than forty of the fifty-four
African countries have chosen the road to political pluralism, though,
like the parable of the sower,47 the fruits of most of these enterprises fell
by the wayside and were devoured by the "birds" of coups d'etat.
By the end of 2000, only five African countries had failed to hold
multiparty elections-Comoros, Congo-Kinshasa, Equatorial Guinea,
Rwanda, and Somalia.48 Kenya is the latest democratic bride. Its success-
ful conduct of a (largely) free and fair election, on December 29, 2002,
ushered Kenyans and, indeed, the entire Africa into a honeymoon. The
retirement of Daniel Arap Moi (the self-proclaimed "Professor of Poli-
tics") as President-pursuant to the Kenyan Constitution49-paved way
for a multiparty election. The election saw a transition of presidential
power from the ruling to the opposition party headed by current Presi-
dent Mwai Kibaki.' ° Ghana had earlier conducted a successful and
credible civilian-to-civilian transition in 2000. Meanwhile, Nigeria has
an "examination" to take in 2003 and Africans are hoping that it will sail
through, like Ghana and Kenya.
The root of this New World Order in Africa could be traced to the
events of 1989-1991, including the break-up of the USSR, the fall of the
Berlin Wall, and the Gulf War. Before the end of the Cold War,
international lawyers rarely used the word "democracy;" and only a few
international institutions supported democratic governance. The end of
the Cold War, however, profoundly shook old assumptions, leading to
international law's newfound interest in fostering transitions to
democracy and its emphasis on good governance. "As the influence and
interest of the Soviet Union declined (and later collapsed with its
45. Id.
46. See Joel D. Barkan, The Many Faces of Africa: Democracy Across a Varied Conti-
nent, 25 HARV. INT'L REV. 72 (2002).
47. See Matthew 13:1-8.
48. See Barkan, supra note 46, at 72.
49. KENYA CONST. ch. II, pt. 1, arts. 9(l)-(2) (providing that the term of office of the
president shall be five years from the date he is sworn in, and that "no person shall be elected
to hold office as President for more than two terms").
50. See, e.g., Russell Smith, Profile: Kenya's New Leader, BBC WORLD ONLINE, Dec.
29, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2612893.stm (last visited Sept. 10, 2003).
51. Pat Lauderdale & Pietro Toggia, An Indigenous View of the New World Order: So-
malia and the Ostensible Rule of Law, 34 J. ASIAN & AFR. STUD. 157, 158 (1999).
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demise), Western states and the organizations they influenced gained
considerably greater leverage over African governments, surpassing the
general client-dependent relationship of the 1970s and 1980s.' '52 With the
end of the Cold War, international attention changed from the debate on
the New International Economic Order (NIEO)" to the virtues of
democratic governance, the rule of law, and pluralism.54
A new dawn has, thus, arisen in Africa,55 though it is still hazy. While
joyful progress has been made in parts of the continent, anxiety has ex-
ceeded happiness in others because many transitions to democratic
polities have not been smooth. It appears, for example, that notwith-
standing the introduction of multiparty rule, most sub-Saharan political
systems are still characterized by old patrimonial tendencies, related to
underlying political economies and cultures, which were hardly affected
by the change in ideological tune. For reasons that are not altruistic,
newly established democratic orders have devolved into pseudo-
democracies. In other cases, superficial changes have been used as a
cosmetic screen for the continuation of (often) brutal regimes."56
These patrimonial tendencies have made it difficult to confidently
assert that Africa has achieved true democracy that guarantees, even
minimally, the rule of law and human rights. 7 Witness, for example, the
following pessimistic assessment of the process of democratization in
Africa:
Africa's third wave of democratization is now well into its
second half-decade. However uneven its progress, democracy
now sets the terms of political discourse in Africa; in this sense,
the third wave has already proved more durable than the first
two. Yet the euphoria that accompanied the arrival of the third
wave in Africa has long since evaporated; even the most
52. KPUNDEH, supra note 31, at 31.
53. See, e.g., Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order
(NIEO), G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., Agenda Item 7, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3201 (1974). Three ingredients comprise the NIEO. First, the elimination of the eco-
nomic dependence of developing countries on a developed country. Second, the promotion of
accelerated development of the economies of the developing countries on the principle of self-
reliance. Third, the introduction of appropriate institutional changes for the global manage-
ment of world resources in the interest of mankind as a whole.
54. See Theo van Boven, Human Rights and the Emerging Concept of Good Govern-
ance, Paper Presented at the Conference on Good Governance for Africa: Whose Governance?
(Nov. 23-24, 1995), available at http://www.ecdpm.org/pubs/govbov.htm (last visited Sept.
10, 2003).
55. See Mike Afrani, A New Order Cometh, NEW AFR., Feb. 2001, at 16.
56. See, e.g., DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA (Larry Diamond & Marc F Plattner eds.,
1999) (examining the state of progress of democracy in Africa at the end of the 1990s).
57. See Can the Leopard Change Its Spots?, supra note 30, at 1236.
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optimistic advocates of democratization would join Larry
Diamond in cautioning that democratization is "bound to be
gradual, messy, fitful and slow, with many imperfections along
the way." In no other region of the world has the global third
wave encountered such a hostile economic and political
environment8
Reality emphasizes this precarious situation. In Africa, war, hunger,
volatility, insecurity, poverty, lack of credibility and accountability, mili-
tary juntas, and dictatorships flourish. 9 Even at the moment, sagging
economic performance, backsliding on democracy and other human
rights reforms, and increased national and regional tensions menace
much of the continent. The sudden introduction of multiparty elections
has led to protests, rebellions, and regime-orchestrated violence in such
countries as Rwanda, Burundi, Nigeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Ethiopia.
Serious irregularities characterize many elections in Africa. Results of
free elections have been annulled, as in Algeria and Nigeria, while in
others elections have brought little or no change. According to Mohamed
Halfani, only about five sitting African Heads of State were defeated in
democratic elections in the 1990s.6° In Mali, democracy has been a huge
disappointment for most of the population, as illustrated by this frus-
trated comment by Bintou Sanankoua:
Elections are a disappointment to a lot of people. They allow
non-democrats to hold on to power under a democratic gloss...
In my country, the party that won the greatest number of votes in
the last election was kept out of power, just by political tricks.
People don't have much confidence in that kind of system.6'
Africa is currently suffering from a process of protracted transi-
tion-an electoral democracy and political liberalization combined with
elements of authoritarian and clientelist rule.62 In most young democra-
cies in Africa, the military continues to exert political and economic
influence, which ranges "Eflrom significant formal and informal business
dealings to constitutional powers to dissolve elected governments to
58. Crawford Young, Africa: An Interim Balance Sheet, J. DEMOCRACY, Jul. 1996, at
53, 60.
59. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CONSPICUOUS DESTRUCTION: WAR, FAMINE AND
THE REFORM PROCESS IN MOZAMBIQUE (1992).
60. ANDRt LACHANCE, THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, at
http://www.idrc.ca/books/reports/1996/25-01 e.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2003).
61. Id.
62. See generally Joel D. Barkan, Protracted Democratic Transitions in Africa, 7
DEMOCRATIZATION 227 (2000).
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veiled threats to elected leaders who challenge military interests."63 Hav-
ing tasted "forbidden fruit," the military is constantly falling into the
temptation of involvement in power politics in Africa.
In Nigeria, for example, retired military officers, now turned politi-
cians-or "militicians"--continue to exert and maintain political and
economic influence. Their economic influence, for example, covers ma-
jor sectors including oil, banking, farming, telecommunications, and air
transportation.64 They also provide substantial funds to political parties,
which place them in vantage positions to dictate the tunes and tones of
political and economic activities in the country, often in opposition to
popular opinion. Many have now presented themselves as candidates for
elected positions, a development that has worried citizens, 65 because it
appears that their main motive is to continue the institutionalization of
corruption and regime patronage that has characterized previous military
regimes.
The allurements of power in Africa have led to widespread and sys-
tematic perversions of the constitutional system. Many African
governments still flagrantly disobey the constitution and law that they
swore to defend, or that they themselves made. It is largely in Africa that
political leaders unilaterally alter constitutions, bully weak legislatures
and judiciaries, and openly manipulate and rig elections, "often at devas-
tating effect on human development.' 66 In Arap Moi's Kenya, individual
freedoms were stifled, 67 and ethnic differences used to fan embers of
conflicts. A return to a multiparty system also resulted in violent clashes
63. U.N. Development Programme, Human Development Report 2002: Deepening
Democracy in a Fragmented World at 88, U.N. Sales No. E.02.1II.B.1 (2002) [hereinafter
UNDP Report 2002].
64. Id.
65. In Nigeria, for example, four retired generals-Olusegun Obasanjo (incumbent
president), Muhammadu Buhari (who overthrew the civilian government in 1983), Ike Nwa-
chukwu, and Odumegu Ojukwu (the ex-secessionist Biafran leader)-have, largely through
manipulations, won their parties' nominations to stand as candidates for the 2003 presidential
elections. See, e.g., Ademola Olajire & Nduka Uzuakpundu, 2003 Polls: Emergence of Gener-
als Worries Soyinka, VANGUARD (Apapa, Nigeria), Jan. 13, 2003 (reporting on an interview
with Wole Soyinka, in which the latter expressed concern over the emergence of army gener-
als as presidential candidates in the 2003 elections). As Soyinka queried: "Is democracy for
those who have accumulated wealth through occupying illegal and undemocratic positions in
this country, while those who do not have the money to even call a meeting of two to three
persons are denied the right to politically associate?" Id.
66. UNDP Report 2002, supra note 63, at v.
67. See Makau Mutua, Justice Under Siege: The Rule of L.aw and Judicial Subservience
in Kenya, 23 HuM. RTS. Q. 96 (2001).
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among different ethnic groups from 1991 to 1998.68 Far from being the
spontaneous result of a return to political pluralism, there is clear evi-
dence that the government of Daniel Arap Moi helped to provoke ethnic
violence for political purposes. In the least, he did not take adequate
steps to prevent such violence from spiraling out of control.69
Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe habitually resorts to constitutional
amendments to reverse decisions of the Supreme Court with which he
disagrees and "to attenuate the constitutional guarantees of human rights,
including the rule of law."70 Similarly, in C6te d'Ivoire, the court system
is used as a means to harass political opposition leaders and independent
jurists; indeed, the judiciary has become "highly vulnerable" to execu-
tive interference."
The structural and normative legacy with which most African States
still struggle has led some to argue that maybe Africa's problem is that
of State reconstruction, rather than democracy.72 This question is far from
being settled. What is clear is that the growing problem of democratiza-
tion has given African leaders concern, which probably explains their
collective resolve in the last few years to erect new norms on democratic
governance. In the next Part, the Article examines the concept of democ-
ratic entitlements in international law and relations, before considering
the norms on democratic governance in Africa.
III. DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AS A HUMAN RIGHT
Part III briefly discusses the generations of human rights and the cri-
tiques that follow this classification. It asks if the categories are closed or
if there are emergent generations of human rights, such as the right to
democratic governance. How, if at all, did this right enter the interna-
tional human rights agenda? What is its relevance to African legal and
political discourses?
68. See Laurence Juma, Ethnic Politics and the Constitutional Review Process in
Kenya, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 471, 495-97 (2002) (examining how ethnic questions
could be addressed in Kenya through constitutional engineering).
69. See, e.g., Kenya's Dynastic Politics: Moi and His Band of Young Turks, ECONOMIST,
Dec. 15, 2001, at 40 (describing the way that Daniel Arap Moi has held on to power).
70. See Lord Lester of Herne Hill, The Challenge of Bangalore: Making Human Rights
a Practical Reality, 3 EuR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 273, 277 (1999).
71. Can the Leopard Change Its Spots?, supra note 30, at 1234 (quoting ATTACKS ON
JUSTICE: THE HARASSMENT AND PERSECUTION OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS 231 (Mona Rish-
mawi ed., 2000)) (reporting how a High Court Judge was forced to resign because he made a
decision that did not go well with the government in power).
72. See MARINA OTTAWAY, AFRICA'S NEW LEADERS: DEMOCRACY OR STATE RECON-
STRUCTION? (1999).
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A. The Periodization of Rights
1. The Concept of Generations
Since 1977, when Karel Vasak introduced the concept of generations
into the corpus of human rights discourse, the debate has taken many
forms and shapes. Vasak traced the developments of human rights and
concluded that, basically, rights are divided into three generations. The
first, he called libertg (liberty), which applies to civil and political rights;
the second, he termed egalit6 (equality), which relates to economic, so-
cial, and cultural rights; and the third, he termed fraternitj (solidarity),
referring to those rights that are held by the collectives, in other words,
"group" or "people's" rights .7 These classifications, sometimes declared
by a color scheme of "blue," "red," and "green, 74 are based on three dif-
ferent philosophies. Each generation has its distinctive characteristics,
each presumably more developed and sophisticated than its predeces-
75
sor.
This Article will not go into detailed discussions of the generations
metaphor. Suffice it to note that the first-generation rights are negative
rights,76 or "immunity claims" by citizens toward the State, in the sense
that they limit the power of a government to protect peoples' rights
against its power. They relate to the sanctity of the individual and his
rights within the socio-political milieu in which he is located. They im-
ply that no government or society should act against individuals in
certain ways that would deprive them of inherent political or personal
rights, such as the rights to life, liberty, and security of person, freedom
of speech, press, assembly, and religion.77
The second-generation rights are claims to social equality, consisting
of economic, social, and cultural rights. They are positive rights in that
they enhance the power of the government to do something for the
person, to enable her or him in some way. They display a highly social
orientation in the sense that they evolve to temper the equally highly
73. Karel Vasak, A 30-year Struggle, I I UNESCO COURIER 29(1977).
74. See JOHAN GALTUNG, HUMAN RIGHTS IN ANOTHER KEY 151-56 (1994).
75. Contra Theo C. van Boven, Distinguishing Criteria of Human Rights, in THE IN-
TERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 43 (Karel Vasak ed., 1982) (suggesting that
they are compatible, even concordant).
76. The terms "negative" and "positive," as used here are not value statements. Nega-
tive rights imply that states have to refrain from certain actions, and positive rights imply that
they have to take certain actions.
77. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., arts. 1-21, at 71, UN Doc. A/RES/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368
[hereinafter ICCPR].
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individualistic orientation of first-generation rights. They are, however,
generally interpreted as programmatic clauses, obligating governments
and legislatures to pursue social policies, but do not create individual
claims. They require the affirmative action of governments for theirimplementation."
The ongoing attempts "to convert needs into rights ... is the hall-
mark of contemporary human rights."79 It is in this respect that the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 0 makes a significant
contribution to the international human rights corpus. The Charter was
one of the very few multilateral human rights treaties to recognize the
indivisibility and interdependence of negative and positive rights. For
example, its preamble provides:
[I]t is henceforth essential to pay particular attention to the right
to development and that civil and political rights cannot be dis-
sociated from economic, social and cultural rights in their
conception as well as universality and that the satisfaction of
economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the en-
joyment of civil and political rights.8'
78. See Claude Welch Jr., Human Rights as a Problem in Contemporary Africa, in Hu-
MAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 11, 24 (Claude Welch & Ronald I. Meltzer eds.,
1984). The UDHR implies that every government and society should act for individual mem-
bers to enable them to enjoy certain social and economic rights and benefits pertaining to
social security, employment, housing, education, health care, and the general standard of liv-
ing. See UDHR, supra note 77, arts. 22-28; International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360, (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976)
[hereinafter ICESCRI.
79. Upendra Baxi, Too Many, or Too Few, Human Rights?, I Hum. RTs. L. REV. 1, 3
(2001) (noting that this enlargement of the scope makes any serious judgment on the effi-
ciency and quality of human rights difficult).
80. AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter AFRICAN CHARTER]. For literature, see, for
example, U. ORJI UMOZURIKE, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS
(1997); Philip Amoah, The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: An Effective
Weapon for Human Rights?, 4 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 226 (1992); Richard Gittleman, The
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Legal Analysis, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 667
(1982); Makau Wa Mutua, The African Human Rights System in a Comparative Perspective, 3
LEGAL F. 31 (1997); Obinna Okere, The Protection of Human Rights in Africa and the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: Comparative Analysis with the European and Ameri-
can Systems, 6 HuM. RTS. Q. 141 (1984); U. Orji Umozurike, The African Charter on Human
and Peoples'Rights, 77 Am. J. INT'L L. 902 (1983).
81. AFRICAN CHARTER, supra note 80, pmbl., para. 7. African leaders reemphasized the
indivisibility, universality, and interdependence of all human rights in the Algiers Declaration,
supra note 18.
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However, unlike the first two generations, which focus largely on in-
dividuals, the third-generation rights include the rights of peoples82 and
groups.83 It has received increasing rhetorical affirmation at the interna-
tional level, though "only the peoples' rights to self-determination and to
disposal of natural wealth, included in the International Covenants have
received authoritative acceptance in international law."" Other group
rights include development, peace, environment, ownership of the com-
mon heritage of mankind, and communication.85
As with the second-generation rights, the African Charter parts ways
with other regional human rights conventions by providing for peoples'
rights, to reflect the African focus on collectivities.86 Indeed, at the OAU
Summit Conference of 1979 in Monrovia, when the Charter was still
being elaborated, some States, notably Guinea Republic and Madagas-
car, had insisted that the proposed Charter include peoples' rights.
The peoples' rights guaranteed in the Charter include the right of
equality of peoples and nondomination of one people by another, 7 as
well as the important right of self-determination. Another is the right to
disposal of natural wealth and resources in the interest of the people,89
"with a view to strengthening African unity and solidarity,'" 90 but "with-
out prejudice to the obligation of promoting international economic co-
operation based on mutual respect, equitable exchange and the principles
of international law."9'
2. A Critique of the Generations Metaphor
The generations metaphor reflects the essential dynamism of the
human rights tradition, taking cognizance of the fact that specific histori-
cal circumstances form the basis of all demands that are made in the
82. Cf Theo van Boven, Human Rights and Rights of Peoples, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 461,
470-72 (1995).
83. See, e.g., U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. 11, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]
(defining "genocide" to mean "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnic[], racial or religious group...") (emphasis added).
84. See Louis Henkin, Human Rights, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INT'L LAW 886,
890 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992).
85. See Jack Donnelly, Third Generation Rights, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 119, 121 (Catherine Brblmann et al. eds., 1993).
86. See generally Theo van Boven, The Relations between Peoples' Rights and Human
Rights in the African Charter, 7 HUM. RTS. L.J. 183 (1986).
87. See AFRICAN CHARTER, supra note 80, art. 19.
88. Id. art. 20.
89. Id. art. 21(1).
90. Id. art. 21(4).
91. Id. art. 21(3).
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name of human rights. This metaphor, however, has come under intense
attacks by some human rights scholars. Some describe the periodization
of human rights as misleading, to the extent that it implies a hierarchy
within human rights standards. It is, according to this view, also incom-
patible with the indivisibility of human rights, which is a necessary
concomitant of inclusive universality.92 The generations metaphor also
"refers to the idea of succession and to a possible historical description
of the field of human rights in neat and chronological terms. 93 The truth,
says Cees Flinterman, is that "the various so-called generations of hu-
man rights, especially the first generation of civil and political rights and
the second of social (economic and cultural rights) have themselves
grown and expanded in a more or less parallel way."
9 4
Others believe that the concept of generations, particularly third-
generation rights, tends to expand the scope of human rights and that
such expansion may sacrifice quality at the altar of quantity. The current
pace of inclusion of all types of endeavors as "human rights," according
to this view, may serve to dilute the concept and render the enforcement
of rights difficult. This fear appears to be justified by the fact that foreign
investors, global corporations, and international financial capital-in
short, global capitalism-are asking for collective recognition and pro-
tection of their "rights." Upendra Baxi, for example, notes the tourism
efforts of the hospitality and transportation industries to persuade the
U.N. to recognize tourism as "a universal human right".95
According to Milan Kundera, in a cynical portrait of the attempt to
convert every human desire, need, or want into human rights:
The world has become man's right and everything in it has be-
come a right: the desire for love the right to love, the desire for
rest the right to rest, the desire for friendship the right to friend-
ship, the desire to exceed the speed limit the right to exceed the
speed limit, the desire for happiness the right to happiness, the
desire to publish a book the right to publish a book, the desire to
shout in the street in the middle of the night the right to shout in
the street.96
92. See Cees Flinterman, Three Generations of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN A
PLURALIST WORLD 75 (Jan Betting et al. eds., 1990).
93. Id. at 76.
94. Id.
95. See Baxi, supra note 79, at I n.1. Baxi questions whether each and every human
social problem can be best defined and solved "through the talismanic property of human
rights enunciations." Id. at 1.
96. MILAN KUNDERA, IMMORTALITY 136 (Peter Kussi trans., 1991).
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There is, thus, a call for some quality control of human rights, an
identification of core human rights, whose respect by all States should be
mandatory, giving rise both to international concern and direct action.97
The production of a new human rights genre "should be marked by effi-
ciency, constructed not just in terms of the quantity but the quality of
contemporary human rights norms and standards. '98 Baxi sets out tests of
quality for the enunciation or "production" of new human rights based
on the following:
(1) efficiency of the deliberative process leading to production of
draft documents, efficiency here measured by considerations of
equitable representation and participation as well as levels of
expertise or insight...
(2) clarity and communicability (or translatability) of textual
outcomes ... levels of consensus reached (on individual formu-
lations and the text as a whole)...
(3) consensus levels measured, partly, by the extent of reserva-
tions, derogations, declarations and statements of understanding
when right enunciation takes the form of an international treaty
and by patterns of voting power when it assumes forms of decla-
rations or resolutions)...
(4) specificity or diffuseness of definitions of violative behav-
iours and levels of accountability monitoring or implementation
(5) mechanisms or processes for promotion and protection, in-
cluding strategies for human rights education [and]
(6) procedures for collective review and reformulation.99
B. Making Room for Yet Another Generation:
The Right to Democratic Governance
If the inclusion of all categories of human problems as human rights
could possibly harm the human rights movement-necessitating a call
for quality control-the question is why should another generation of
rights be added to the existing generations? Why crowd further, the
already congested traffic? This Section attempts to answer this question.
97. See, e.g., Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality
Control, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 607, 614-15 (1984).
98. Baxi, supra note 79, at 2.
99. Id. at 3 n.5.
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It restates the arguments for a fourth generation of human rights, in
particular the right to democratic governance. It traces the contours of
this right, particularly in the context of African milieu and finally
attempts a critique of the enterprise.
a. Defining the Terms
Since certain titles or terms will be frequently used in the remainder
of this paper, both in narrative and allusion, it will be well to define or, at
least, describe them. What do we mean by the words "democracy" and
"governance," or by the phrase "right to democratic governance?"
i. Democracy
Democracy is a fuzzy and fussy concept. Some assert that it "con-
sist[s] of no more than the essential element of periodic, genuine,
contested elections,"'' ° and that it "concentrates on, and sometimes does
not go beyond, the fundamental premise of 'rule by the people' (or re-
lated expressions of this premise, such as popular sovereignty, or
government [expressing] the will of the people) through one or another
form of representative government that elections are meant to achieve."'0 '
This Article, however, asserts that democracy must be defined func-
tionally, rather than as involving just formal political processes like
periodic elections. Democracy is an ideology demanding that those en-
trusted with authority must use it for the common or public good.'0 2 A
significant element of democracy is reciprocity, "between governors and
the governed, between those who exercise political leadership in society
100. HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CON-
TEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 888 (2d ed. 2000).
101. Id.
102. Legal theorists, of diverse views and backgrounds, have espoused the cause of the
common good in examining the essence of law. They include Jeremy Bentham's principle of
utility: JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLA-
TION 12 (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., Althone Press 1970) (1789); Lon Fuller's purposive
approach to law: LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964); and John Finnis' theory of
human basic good: JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980). Others in-
clude Joseph Raz's idea of the function of law: Joseph Raz, Reasons for Action, Decisions and
Norms, in PRACTICAL REASONING (Joseph Raz ed., 1978); Deryck Beyleveld and Roger
Brownsword's notion of the essence of law: DERYCK BEYLEVELD & ROGER BROWNSWORD,
LAW AS A MORAL JUDGMENT (1986); H.L.A. Hart's criteria for the existence of a viable social
organization: H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); and Taslim Elias's law in a devel-
oping society: T.O. ELIAS, LAW IN A DEVELOPING SOCIETY (1972). See generally O.A.
Obilade, The Idea of the Common Good in Legal Theory, in ISSUES IN NIGERIAN LAW I (J.A.
Omotola ed., 1990).
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and those who are led, between those who exercise authority and those
who are the subjects of this authority." 3
Democracy is connected "to thoughts about ... aspirations, solidar-
ity, virtue, faith, [and] the development of political identities" in a
civilized society.'0 More specifically, it is the right of peoples to make
choices about the quality of their lives: the participation of all segments
of society-not just the majority-in decisions that affect their lives.
Democracy also requires that people have equal access to information so
that they can make these decisions intelligently. It also means equality
before law enforcement agencies, including equal protection from arbi-
trary interference, whether it is from government officials or private
actors. It involves the fair distribution of resources, including equal ac-
cess to education.
0 5
A component of democracy is the right of citizens freely to express
their opinions on all matters of governance. This includes the right to
protest, dissent, or even disobey the laws. It even includes the right to
abolish the government when it becomes destructive of citizens' rights
and, ultimately, "to institute new Government, laying its foundation on
such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.' 6
ii. Governance; Good Governance
Governance, in contradistinction with democracy, is the process
whereby public institutions conduct public affairs, manage public re-
sources, and guarantee the realization of human rights. Put differently, it
is the structure of rules and processes that affect the exercise of power,
particularly with regard to openness, participation, accountability, effec-
tiveness, and coherence. Goran Hyd6n defines it as
that aspect of politics that aims to formulate and manage the
rules of the political arena in which state and civil society actors
operate and interact to make authoritative decisions. In more op-
erational terms, governance refers to those measures that involve
setting the rules for the exercise of power and settling conflicts
over such rules. Such rules translate into constitutions, laws, cus-
toms, administrative regulations, and international agreements,
103. KPUNDEH, supra note 31, at 23.
104. See Ulrich R. Haltem, Book Review, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 135, 136 (1996) (reviewing
JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE (1995)).
105. See Howard Zinn, How Democratic Is America?, if? POINTS OF VIEW: READINGS IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 2, 2-3 (Robert E. DiClerico & Allan S. Hammock
eds., 1983).
106. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)
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all of which in one way or the other provide the framework for
the formulation and implementation of policy decisions.'07
Good governance, in particular, is "the responsible use of political
authority to manage a nation's affairs."'' 8 It is the key to economic devel-
opment and, therefore, must be participatory, transparent, and
accountable.' ° It must also be effective and equitable, in order to pro-
mote the rule of law." 0 The yardsticks for its measurement are effective
leadership, technical policy competence, and administrative efficiency.
Good governance, really, is a basket of many practices: "a professional
civil service, elimination of corruption in government, a predictable
transparent and accountable administration, democratic decision-
making, the supremacy of the rule of law, effective protection of human
rights, an independent judiciary, a fair economic system, appropriate
devolution and decentralization of government, [and] appropriate levels
of military spending."" The true test of "good" governance is the extent
"to which it delivers on the promise of human rights-civil, cultural,
economic, political, and social."" 
2
iii. Right to Democratic Governance
The right to democratic governance has been defined as:
the subjective capacity of individuals and peoples to demand of
their rulers a political regime based on the rule of law and
separation of powers, in which citizens can periodically elect
their leaders and representatives in free and fair elections, on the
basis of the interaction between a number of political parties,
107. Goran Hyden, Governance and the Reconstitution of Political Order, in STATE,
CONFLICT AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 185 (Richard Joseph ed., 1999); cf. WORLD BANK,
GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 1 (1992) (defining governance as "the manner in which
power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for devel-
opment").
108. CLARENCE J. DIAS & DAVID GILLIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND DEVEL-
OPMENT 10 (1993).
109. See Ngaire Woods, Good Governance in International Organizations, 5 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 39, 43 (1999) (arguing that the three core elements of good governance are
participation, accountability, and fairness); cf. ANNAN, supra note 5, at 13 (noting that
"[b]etter governance means greater participation, coupled with accountability").
110. See U.N. Development Programme, Reconceptualising Governance, U.N. DIsCus-
SION PAPER, at 14, (2003), at http://magnet.undp.org/Docs/!UN98-21.PDF/Recon.htm (last
visited Sept. 8, 2003).
111. See Linda C. Reif, Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human
Rights Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights Protection, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
1, 16-17 (2000).
112. U.N. OHCHR, HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPMENT: GOOD GOVERNANCE (2000), at
http://193.194.138.190/development/govemance-01 .html (last visited Sept. 10, 2003).
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full respect for the exercise of the freedoms of expression, the
press and association and the effective enjoyment of human
rights."3
Democratic governance is about how individuals and societies can
achieve institutions that make politics both civil and capable. Democratic
decision-making gains its legitimacy from being rooted in the people.
Accountability is defined as "holding public officials responsible for
their actions."' 4 As one observer noted, "Accountable governance is
about reconstituting a political order in which the state's accountability
towards society is increased. It... brings state and society closer to each
other," allowing for "a degree of bargaining between the government and
the public," as well as increasing the public's discretion concerning the
use of public resources."5 In short, accountability involves the constitu-
tion of the individual as a citizen with rights and duties rather than
merely as a subject. This is a necessary condition for popular sovereignty
and, ultimately, democracy.
1. The Case for a Right to Democratic Governance
Many contemporary international jurists and scholars have
advocated for recognition of the right to democratic governance. The
foremost advocate is Thomas Franck,'16 and his proposition will be the
point of departure for the discourse that follows. Franck asserts that
"democratic entitlement" is a recognized and recognizable right. He
anchors his theory on two notions: the idea that governments derive their
just powers from the consent of the governed"-a Lockeian
113. Promotion and Consolidation of Democracy, U.N. ESCOR, 53d Sess., at 17, 81,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/32, at 17 (2001) [hereinafter Promotion and Consolidation of
Democracy].
114. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ASSESSING PROGRESS TOWARDS DEMOCRACY AND
GOOD GOVERNANCE: SUMMARY OF A WORKSHOP 4 (Daniel Druckman ed., 1992) [hereinafter
NRC SUMMARY].
115. Anne Mette Kjaer, Governance and State Capacity in Africa, Research
Proposal, University of Aarhus, Denmark (2002), at http://www.ps.au.dk/mkj/
OngoingProjectsMateriale/project-proposal.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2003) (discussing the
concept of state capacity in Africa and offering hypotheses as to what factors influence the
building of such capacity).
116. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITU-
TIONS (1995) (positing an emerging fight to democratic governance and a participatory
electoral process); Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992); James Crawford, Democracy and International Law, 64 BRIT. YB.
INT'L L. 113 (1993); see generally DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000) (assessing international law's newfound interest
in fostering transitions to democracy).
117. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, supra note 116, at 46.
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philosophy' 1 8-and the idea that the international legitimacy of a State
requires acknowledgement by mankind." 9 These two notions form a
"radical vision" that is "rapidly becoming, in our time, a normative rule
of the international system.' 20 Analyzing the international community's
response to the coup in the former Soviet Union and in Haiti, Franck
argues that, "a new legal entitlement is being created, based in part on
custom and in part on the collective interpretation of treaties."'
2
'
According to Franck, a community expectation has emerged, to the
intent that "those who seek the validation of their empowerment patently
govern with the consent of the governed. Democracy, thus, is on the way
to becoming a global entitlement, one that increasingly will be promoted
and protected by collective international processes."'' 22 The "democratic
entitlement," he continues, is gradually being transformed "from moral
prescription to international legal obligation"'23 largely because such en-
titlement results from "the craving of governments for validation.' 24 As
Franck argues,
[In order to] achieve such a system of autochthonous validation
(and thus to facilitate governing), those who hold or seek politi-
cal power have made a far-sighted bargain comparable to John
Locke's social compact; they have surrendered control over the
nation's validation process to various others: national electoral
118. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 374-75 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Mentor Books 1965) (1690). The essential teaching of Locke was that all legitimate govern-
ments derive their authority solely from the consent of the governed; cf THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE pmbl. (U.S. 1776) (proclaiming that, "[w]e hold these truths to be self evident,
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of
the governed....").
119. See Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, supra note 116, at 46.
120. Id.
121. Id. at47.
122. Id. at 46; cf. Afr. Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights, Resolution on the Mili-
tary (1994) [hereinafter Resolution on the Military], compiled in RECOMMENDATIONS AND
RESOLUTIONS 22, (Dec. 2002), at http://www.achpr.org/Recominendations Resolutions-
_ACHPR_88-02.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2003) [hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESO-
LUTIONS] (maintaining that, "the trend world-wide and in Africa in particular is to condemn
military take-overs and the intervention by the military in politics .... The resolution calls on
"incumbent military governments to handover [sic] political power to democratically elected
governments without prolonging their incumbencies and unnecessarily delaying the return to
democratic civilian rule.").
123. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, supra note 116, at 47.
124. Id. at 50 (arguing also that in the absence of validation, governance becomes more
difficult).
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commissions, judges, an inquisitive press and, above all, the
citizenry acting at the ballot box.'25
Franck argues that the evolution of democratic entitlement has oc-
curred in three normative phases. The first phase was the right to self-
determination, followed by free expression and, finally, "the entitlement
to a participatory electoral process."' 26 The right to self-determination,
for example, has replaced the previously accepted norm of colonialism at
the end of the Second World War.' As a universal concept, it encom-
passes obligations owed by all governments to their citizens, as well as
to the international community.'28 The history of self-determination is,
indeed, "a remarkable saga that tells of a rule that gradually augments its
compliance pull, overcomes resistance and ultimately brings about an
incontestable, historic transformation."'29 It is far from certain, however,
that self-determination will lead to a "universal right to democracy,"
since the former "must permit a people to decide its own political system
and form of government."
'
'
30
Franck's argument is also embedded in the idea of national democ-
racy. In other words, the territorial state continues to define the limits of
the democratic community. All that is necessary to satisfy the human
right to democratic government is the creation and maintenance of na-
tional democratic institutions, including periodic elections and a
representative assembly.
There are also institutional voices that recognize the right to democ-
ratic governance. For example, in 1999, the U.N. Human Rights
Commission adopted a resolution on the Promotion of the Right to De-
mocracy,3' which, significantly, was the first text approved in the U.N.
recognizing the existence of this right. The resolution refers to develop-
ments in international law related to the recognition of democracy as a
value for international protection, and to its interdependence with human
rights. It recalls the large body of international law and instruments, in-
cluding the resolutions of the Commission on Human Rights and those
of the General Assembly, and confirms "the right to full participation
125. Id.
126. Id. at 90.
127. Id. at 54.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 55.
130. Tony Evans, If Democracy, Then Human Rights?, 22 THIRD WORLD. Q. 623, 632
(2001).
131. Promotion of the Right to Democracy, Commission on Human Rights Res.
1999/57, UN ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, 57th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/
1999/57 (1999) (hereinafter Promotion of the Right to Democracy].
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and the other fundamental democratic rights and freedoms inherent in
any democratic society."'32 Furthermore, the U.N. recognizes that "the
right to development and the principle of the right of self-determination
of peoples are concepts that are mutually interdependent with democracy
and human rights.' 33
This recognition of the interdependence between democracy and de-
velopment is particularly significant for Africa, which is struggling with
questions of sustainable development. The continent has remained "the
most backward in terms of development from whatever angle it is
viewed and the most vulnerable as far as peace, security and stability are
concerned."'' 34 Regrettably, African leaders have, until recently, failed to
see that bad governance is the main reason for the underdevelopment of
the continent.
The UN Human Rights Commission has demarcated the various lay-
ers of the right to democratic governance. 135 These include:
(a) the rights to freedom of opinion and expression, of thought,
conscience and religion, and of peaceful association and assem-
bly; (b) the right... to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas through any media; (c) the rule of law, including legal pro-
tection of citizens' rights, interests and personal security, and
fairness in the administration of justice and independence of the
judiciary; (d) the right of universal and equal suffrage, as well as
free voting procedures and periodic and free elections.
3 6
Other rights it has distinguished are:
(e) the right of political participation, including equal opportu-
nity for all citizens to become candidates; (f) transparent and
accountable government institutions; (g) the right of citizens to
choose their governmental system through constitutional and
other democratic means; and (h) the right to equal access to pub-
lic service in one's own country."'
132. Id.
133. Promotion and Consolidation of Democracy, supra note 113, 4.
134. Yaounde Declaration (Africa: Preparing for the 21st Century), 2, 6, OAU Doc.
AHG/Decl.3(XXXII) (1996) (pointing out that Africa has "the lowest life expectancy, the
highest infant mortality and illiteracy rates, the lowest GNP, in short, the lowest human devel-
opment indicator.. ").
135. See Promotion and Consolidation of Democracy, supra note 113, T 5.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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2. How Democratic Governance Entered
Into the Human Rights Agenda
A number of developments led to the emergence of a right to democ-
ratic governance in international law. Franck, for example, cites U.N.
instruments and programs in the field of human rights and electoral as-
sistance.3 Each of these instruments recognizes related specific
entitlements as accruing to individual citizens, thus constituting interna-
tionally mandated restraints on governments. Others, however, trace the
development to the insistence by Western aid donors on open and ac-
countable government as a condition precedent to development
assistance 39 to the poorer countries of the South. 0
Donor governments and agencies are continuously making decisions
on which country to assist, how much aid to give, and for what pur-
poses-largely because aid needs are much larger than available aid.'
4
'
Up to the 1980s, conditions were only economic ones. Human rights
were peripheral, for example, to the European Community (now Euro-
pean Union), essentially because the Council was founded as an
138. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, supra note 116, at 55
(arguing that this transition "was facilitated by the UN reporting requirements, the organiza-
tion's close scrutiny of the work of colonial administrations and the active involvement in
monitoring elections and plebiscites in territories advancing toward independence"); see also
id. at 71, 74-76, 82-83 (regarding UN-inspired human rights instruments that have relevance
to democratic governance in Africa).
139. Development assistance covers a wide range of resource transfers, including "tech-
nical assistance, food and commodity transfers, budget support, rural and urban projects,
infrastructural and institutional assistance, sectoral specific assistance targeted, for example, to
agriculture, education, health and industry, and bilateral and multilateral channels for interven-
tion." R.C. RIDELL, FOREIGN AID RECONSIDERED 204 (1987).
140. Reif, supra note 11, at I (noting that "[t]he concept of good governance developed
in the practice of relevant international organizations and some donor governments as a guide
for rebuilding or reforming governance structures"); see also Akin Oyebode, UN and the Pro-
tection of Human Rights in Africa, in AFRICA AND THE UN SYSTEM: THE FIRST FiFrY YEARS
86, 89 (George A. Obiozor & Adekunle Ajala eds., 1998); Babacar Ndiaye, International Co-
operation to Promote Democracy and Human Rights: Principles and Programmes, 49 REV.
INT'L COMM'N JURISTS 23 (1992).
141. While three-quarters of official aid is bilateral, the remaining third is multilateral,
with the World Bank and the IMF dominating these latter transactions. Resources also flow
through regional multilateral banks, including the Inter-American, African, and Asian Devel-
opment Banks, and through the institutions of the European Community and the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The U.N. is also heavily involved, through the
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the
U.N. Development Program (UNDP). These transactions, however, are confined to the provi-
sions of technical assistance and advisors, and to research and training. See TERESA HAYTER,
EXPLOITED EARTH 28 (1989).
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economic association. Besides, European nations were reluctant to con-
demn States that had only recently been decolonized.1
42
Of course, human rights are not synonymous with democracy; but
they are generally regarded as conditions for enhancing democracy and
have, in recent memory, become the basic condition in deciding on per-
formance-related aid. Actually, the problems and consequences of
marginalizing human rights and democracy from development led to a
reformulation of donor aid policy in the late 1980s.143 After the Cold War,
the EU countries began to attach political conditions-including respect
for human rights-to their development cooperation agreements. West-
ern financial institutions imposed structural adjustments and economic
stabilization as conditions for their assistance to African governments.
They also insisted that aid must not support systems that deprive citizens
of equal opportunities to enjoy economic and other resources, including
education and political participation without discrimination.'" Explicit
linkage between reported human rights violations and development aid
has increased in the last couple of years.'45
As a corollary, it has been noted that good governance:
was born at the end of an era in which concern with the misap-
propriating, inefficient and patrimonial State prevailed. [It] was
introduced as part of an agenda of creating enabling States, i.e.,
States that would establish a room for maneuver of enterprises
and citizens that would engender growth as well as efficient re-
source utilization. The good governance agenda was thus the
child of a modified liberal agenda, which made concessions to
the fact that efficient resource utilization also depended on
modes of governance and public involvement. 146
142. See, e.g., Amy Young-Anawaty, Human Rights and the ACP-EEC Lome 11 Conven-
tion: Business as Usual at the EEC, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 63, 79 (1980) (citing the
statement of Mr. Prescott of the United Kingdom at the meeting of the ACP-EEC Council of
Ministers in 1977); Demetrios James Marantis, Human Rights, Democracy, and Development:
The European Community Model, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 5 (1994).
143. See ALEXANDER R. LOVE, DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE OF THE OECD,
DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION: EFFORTS AND POLICIES OF THE MEMBERS OF THE DEVELOP-
MENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE 1991 REPORT 66 (1991).
144. See Lars Adam Rehof, Development Assistance from the Point of View of Human
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC LAW AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE POLICIES OF
THE NORDIC COUNTRIES, 17-20 (Lars Adam Rehof & Claus Gulmann eds., 1989).
145. See KATARINA TOMASEVSKI, COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, HUMAN RIGHTS VIO-
LATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT AID: FROM POLITICS TOWARDS POLICY 3 (1990).
146. Hans-Otto Sano, Good Governance, Accountability and Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND GOOD GOVERNANCE: BUILDING BRIDGES 123, 123 (Hans-Otto Sano & Gudmun-
dur Alfredsson eds., 2002).
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African countries themselves appeared to have acknowledged the
connection between democratic governance and development aid when,
in 1996, they admonished the West in the following words: "We hope
our efforts in embarking on macro-economic and political reforms
geared towards achieving greater equilibriums and creating an enabling
economic environment for both local and foreign direct investments
would be supported by a substantial reduction in the debt and a major
inflow of debt-free financial assistance."'
47
This Article will now turn to some illustrative studies on the
development of democratic governance at the international level. It starts
with the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, signed by the Heads of State
or Government of the Conference (now Organization) on Security and
Cooperation in Europe on November 21, 1990. The Charter provides a
striking example of this new approach. In the all-European context of the
Conference, "but phrased in a language which radiated beyond European
boundaries,' 4 the Charter states that:
[T]he free will of the individual, exercised in democracy and
protected by the rule of law, forms the necessary basis for suc-
cessful economic and social development. We will promote
economic activity which respects and upholds human dignity.
Freedom and political pluralism are necessary elements in our
common objective of developing market economies towards sus-
tainable economic growth, prosperity, social justice, expanding
employment and efficient use of economic resources. The suc-
cess of the transition to market economy by countries making
efforts to this effect is important and in the interest of us all.
4 9
The Lome Convention has become one of the many forms of North-
South multilateral arrangements between Western donor countries and
Africa. Under the agreement, which has been revised on many
occasions,'50 sub-Saharan Africa is entitled generally to non-reciprocal
duty-free access to the EU market; technical and industrial cooperation;
147. Yaounde Declaration, supra note 134, T 11.
148. Van Boven, supra note 54.
149. Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 190, 195.
150. There have been four conventions thus far; ACP-EEC Convention, Feb. 28, 1975,
14 I.L.M. 595 (1975) [hereinafter Lome Convention I]; Second ACP-EEC Convention, Oct.
31, 1979, 1277 U.N.T.S. 3 (1982) [hereinafter Lome Convention II]; Third ACP-EEC Conven-
tion, Dec. 8, 1984, 24 I.L.M. 571 (1985) [hereinafter Lome Convention III]; Fourth ACP-EEC
Convention, Dec. 15, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 783 (1990), as amended by Mauritius Agreement, Nov.
4, 1995, [hereinafter Lome Convention IV], available at http://www.idea.int/lomelbgr-_docs/
lomeiv.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2003). See generally MARJORIE LISTER, THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD 58-109 (1988).
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economic assistance under the European Development Fund scheme;
and insurance schemes to compensate Lome States for fluctuations in
earnings from primary commodity exports to the EU. Lome Conventions
III and IV brought human rights into the forefront of European
development policies. Lome Convention III, for example, explicitly
incorporated the promotion of human rights as an objective of
development cooperation. '
The turning point, however, came in Lome Convention IV. It reiter-
ates "the right of each State to determine its own political, social,
cultural and economic policy options."'52 It, nevertheless, provides that:
Cooperation shall be directed towards development centred on
man, the main protagonist and beneficiary of development,
which thus entails respect for and promotion of all human rights.
Cooperation operations shall thus be conceived in accordance
with the positive approach, where respect for human rights is
recognised as a basic factor of real development and where co-
operation is conceived as a contribution to the promotion of
these rights.1
53
The Contracting Parties further reiterate-
[T]heir deep attachment to human dignity and human rights,
which are legitimate aspirations of individuals and peoples. The
rights in question are all human rights, the various categories
thereof being indivisible and inter-related, each having its own
legitimacy: non-discriminatory treatment; fundamental human
rights; civil and political rights; economic, social and cultural
rights. 
54
This express linkage of the promotion of human rights to develop-
ment "creat[es] a legal basis for advancing the observance of human
151. See Lome Convention II, supra note 150, art. 4 (referring to promotion of eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights); art. 119 (educational development); art. 122 (grassroots
outreach); art. 123 (the advancement of women); art. 124 (healthcare); and arts. 125-27 (cul-
tural enrichment).
152. Lome Convention IV, supra note 150, art. 2.
153. Id. art. 5(1); see also Resolution to the Council and Representative Meeting in the
Council on Human Rights, Democracy and Development, T 10 Bull. EC 11/1991 (1991),
available at http://www.idea.int/lome/backgrounddocuments/resolution.html (last visited
Sept. 10, 2003) ("The Community and its Member States will explicitly introduce the consid-
eration of ... relations with developing countries; human rights clauses will be inserted in
future cooperation agreements. Regular discussions on human rights and democracy will be
held, within the framework of development cooperation, with the aim of seeking improve-
ments.").
154. Lome Convention IV, supra note 150, art. 5(2).
1239Summer 20031
Michigan Journal of International Law
rights through specific development programs." '55 Indeed, the interna-
tional concern for democratic governance in Africa could be further
illustrated with the Council of Europe's 1992 statements on the human
rights situations of Zaire, Togo, Burundi, Kenya, Algeria, and Equatorial
Guinea. The statements were issued with a view "to promote and raise
awareness concerning human rights and democracy," and to "consolidate
the processes of peace and democratisation."'
5 6
The World Bank has also promoted good governance practice, in-
cluding reform of the public sector.' The Bank defines governance in a
three dimensional framework. The first relates to "the form of political
regime." The second relates to "the process by which authority is exer-
cised in the management of [the] country's economic and social
resources for development." The third dimension relates to "the capacity
of governments to design, formulate, and implement policies and dis-
charge [government] functions." '58 The Bank regards the first dimension
as outside its mandate, preferring to concentrate on the second and third
dimensions. 9 Governance, from these dimensions, is a means toward
promoting economic development rather than an end in itself.'6° This
restrictive, though significant, interpretation is understandably borne out
of the Bank's mandate,' 6' as its Articles of Agreement do not permit it to
drown in the political waters of member countries.
62
155. Marantis, supra note 142, at 9.
156. Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the
Implementation in 1993 of the Resolution of the Council and of the Member States Meeting in
the Council on Human Rights, Democracy and Development, Adopted on 28 November 1991,
COM(94)42 final at 10, 16.
157. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, THE STATE IN A CHANGING WORLD: WORLD DEVELOP-
MENT REPORT (1997); WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE: THE WORLD BANK'S EXPERIENCE
(1994); LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE WORLD BANK: GOVERNANCE AND Hu-
MAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 1995); WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT (1992).
158. See WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE: THE WORLD BANK'S EXPERIENCE, supra note
157, at xiv.
159. Id.
160. See Nicholas H. Moller, The World Bank: Human Rights, Democracy and Govern-
ance, 15 NETH. Q. HuM. RTS. 21, 22 (1997) (examining the prospects that governance holds
for ensuring that the World Bank and its borrower countries respect human rights and democ-
ratic values).
161. The World Bank was set up as a non-political facilitator of investment to help war-
tom and developing countries in their reconstruction and development. See INTERNATIONAL
BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, art. 1 (1960)
[hereinafter IBRD, ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT].
162. Article IV, section l0 provides:
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member;
nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the mem-
ber or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their
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The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the other leg of the Bretton
Woods stool, also promotes those components of good governance that
relate to economic performance. 63 The same goes for the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),' 6 which develop
good governance standards for its development assistance activities.
To sum up, development assistance and other forms of resource
transfers to Africa are now tied to political reforms. This results from the
fact that the international community now regards democracy and good
governance as essential parts of human flourishing. Although actual do-
nor practices differ,6 1 what is not in doubt is that:
[T]here is increasingly strong agreement among donors that po-
litical reforms in Africa must result in reduced corruption and
more financial accountability, better observance of human rights,
independent media and an independent judiciary, participatory
politics, and a liberalized market economy in order to move
closer to the ultimate goal of meaningful economic growth and
development. 66
3. A Critique of the Discourse on Democratic Governance
The good governance discourse will certainly boost the transmission
of ideas in Africa. Not many, however, are convinced. Some believe that
the whole concept of democratic governance is a gimmick, and that in-
ternational law has no business promoting what will merely legitimize a
neoimperialist agenda to remake the world in the image of the West. 67 In
the context of Africa, it is said that the democratization process might
decisions, and these considerations shall be weighted impartially in order to achieve
the purposes stated in Article I.
Id. art. IV, § 10.
163. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, GOOD GOVERNANCE: THE IMF's ROLE 2 (1997) (dis-
cussing the IMF Guidance Note on the Role of the IMF in Governance Issues reference to,
transparency in financial transactions in the public sector, reform of public administration, and'
ridding government of corruption and fraud.)
164. See, e.g., ORG. ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. (OECD), PARTICIPATORY DEVELOP-
MENT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE (1995).
165. See KPUNDEH, supra note 31, at 32 (noting that France links aid to greater liberty
and democracy, Great Britain and the United States recommend good governance, and Japan
focuses on the reduction of military expenditures).
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, "Intolerant Democracies": A Reaction, 37 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 231 (1996); cf. Susan Marks, Democratic Celebration, Democratic Melancholy, 9
FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 73, 77 (1998) (arguing that the right to democratic governance is an
attempt to remake the world in the interests of global capital and that, as currently theorized, it
is based on a highly attenuated conception of democratic governance, pitching it "significantly
lower than any of the specific conceptions of democracy that animate Western politics").
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actually be a public relations trick by African autocrats who are bent on
making their regimes more presentable to Western donors in the after-
math of the Cold War.
Critics also believe that the global governance debate could
legitimize exclusionary democracies, because of "the idea that democ-
ratisation necessarily goes hand-in-hand with the retreat of the state
from its public welfare role and increased economic liberalisation.' ' 68 It
largely prohibits the emergence of democratic systems that cater to the
needs of Africa's poor majority. Like in Zambia, Ghana, Kenya, and
C6te d'Ivoire, the World Bank and the IMF, for example, adhere to the
distinctly undemocratic notion that democracies can only count as ex-
amples of good governance "if the electorate chooses governments that
adhere to a free market ideology.
" 
169
The conditions that permeate African nation-states, though conducive
to the triggering of the transitions from authoritarianism, have been
inimical for further democratization and consolidation. The nature of the
forces that the transition unleashes has put a tremendous burden on the
democratic project, giving rise to the dominant form of democratic polity
in Africa, the pseudo-democracy"O or virtual democracy. ' In this new
form of democracy, "authoritarianism or, at least, illiberalism and neo-
patrimonialism subsist alongside electoral competition.,1 72 In Kenya, aid
donors initially played a central part in advancing the cause of multiparty
activities. Subsequently and on several occasions, they actively impeded
further democratization, in order to avoid "any path that could lead to a
breakdown of the political and economic order, even if this meant
legitimising and prolonging the regime's authoritarian rule."73 Cameroon
offers another illustration of incomplete transition to democracy, given
168. Paul Williams, Indifference and Intervention: International Society and Human
Rights in Africa, 5 J. INT'L HUM. RTS. L. 140, 150 (2001).
169. RITA ABRAHAMSEN, DISCIPLINING DEMOCRACY: DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE AND
GOOD GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA 52 (2000); see also Alex de Waal, The Shadow Economy,
AFR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 24, 27.
170. LARRY DIAMOND, PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 3-4
(1997).
171. See STATE, CONFLICT, AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA (Richard Joseph ed., 1999).
172. See Stephen N. Ndegwa, A Decade of Democracy in Africa, 36 J. ASIAN & AFR.
STUD. 1,2 (2001).
173. Stephen Brown, Authoritarian Leaders and Multiparty Elections in Africa: How
Foreign Donors Help to Keep Kenya's Daniel Arap Moi in Power, 22 THIRD WORLD Q. 725
(2001) (arguing that "prior accounts of Moi and Kanu's re-election in Kenya's 1992 and 1997
polls overemphasise divisions within the opposition and underestimate the role of intema-
tional actors").
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the widespread corruption of President Paul Biya's regime and his
unscrupulous determination to cling to power.14
Although the good governance discourse has, at least in theory, "en-
couraged the emergence of multi-party states in Africa [that indulge] in
periodic elections," these states are in practice "forced to pander to the
needs of international donors and investors at the expense of the poorer
elements of their domestic constituencies." '75 The results are the birth of
"democracies that are exclusionary both in the sense that they cannot
incorporate the poor majority in any meaningful way, and to the extent
that this is a form of democracy where the power and influence of exter-
nal constituencies is extraordinarily high."'76 Western financial
institutions, particularly the Bretton Woods cabals, are largely to blame
for this messy situation in Africa. Joseph Stiglitz, ironically former Chief
Economist of the World Bank, offers a chilling criticism of the Bank's
sister-the IMF-in these significant words:
The IMF likes to go about its business without outsiders asking
too many questions. In theory, the fund supports democratic in-
stitutions in the nations it assists. In practice, it undermines the
democratic process by imposing policies. Officially, of course,
the IMF doesn't "impose" anything. It "negotiates" the condi-
tions for receiving aid. But all the power in the negotiations is on
one side-the IMF's-and the fund rarely allows sufficient time
for broad consensus-building or even widespread consultations
with either parliaments or civil society. Sometimes the IMF dis-
penses with the pretense of openness altogether and negotiates
secret covenants.'
77
There is a widening gap between current political arrangements and
the promise of democracy to give control over public decision-making
on a footing of equality among citizens. This has led to what Susan
Marks calls "democratic melancholy."'7' According to Marks, "[l]arge
arenas of public power are unaccountable. Many citizens consider politi-
cal institutions so irrelevant and remote they do not bother to vote.
174. See generally JOSEPH TAKOUGANG & MILTON KRIEGER, AFRICAN STATE AND SO-
CIETY IN THE 1990s: CAMEROON'S POLITICAL CROSSROADS (1998).
175. Williams, supra note 168, at 150.
176. ABRAHAMSEN, supra note 169, at 145.
177. Joseph Stiglitz, What I Learned at the World Economic Crisis, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr.
17, 2000, cited in Michael W. Doyle, A More Perfect Union? The Liberal Peace and the Chal-
lenge of Globalization, 26 REV. INT'L STUD. 81 (2000).
178. Marks, supra note 167, at 73 (explaining why consciousness of the limitations of
liberal democracy is currently so acute, including "the enduring disappointments of Western
democracy").
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Universal suffrage has not brought equal opportunities to exercise and
influence political power. Economic and social resources continue to be
asymmetrically distributed; and so on." '79 Similarly, the harsh reality of
scarcity conspires with liberal economic dictates to seriously undermine
the promises of democracy: "[L]iberal democracy on the edge of empire
is very thin indeed."'' °
The good governance rhetoric has also succeeded in legitimizing the
particular view that Africa, in particular, and the Third World, in general,
requires Western intervention to develop.'' Globalization may indeed
reinforce, rather than weaken, cultural differentiation between Western
and non-Western societies. This could trigger, in the process, culturally
conservative and even reactionary backlashes capable of complicating
the evolution of a global culture of human rights."' It may also under-
mine the articulation of shared social and political identity essential for
sustainable economic growth. The civil society, thus, will not be able to
articulate its position clearly where ethnic and group solidarities inhibit
the emergence of autonomous individuals acting as moral agents. '83
These criticisms notwithstanding, it may be said that the right to
democratic governance is a core right and that the international commu-
nity should, through the instrumentality of international law, advance
and promote it, especially in developing African countries. One central
problem of governance is the relationship between the State and its citi-
zens. Consequently, the search for limitation on arbitrary government-
embodied in the concept of constitutionalism-must be a universal, as
opposed to merely a Western, ideal. Constitutionalism is not opposable
179. Id.
180. David Moore, Neoliberal Globalisation and the Triple Crisis of 'Modernisation' in
Africa: Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Africa, 22 THIRD WORLD
Q. 909, 911 (2001).
181. Williams, supra note 168, at 150.
182. See Rhoda E. Howard, Human Rights and the Culture Wars: Globalization and the
Universality of Human Rights, 53 INT'L J. 94, 94-95 (1998); see also Human Rights Ques-
tions: Letter Dated 16 June 1993 from the Charge d'Affaires A.!L of the Permanent Mission of
Indonesia, to the United Nation Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess.,
Agenda Item 115, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/48/214 (1993) (urging that human rights not "serve as a
pretext to wage a political campaign against" other countries by "linking questions of human
rights to economic and developmental cooperation"); Vichai Phuphatana, Asia Rejects Pres-
sure on Human Rights: Regional Declaration Efforts to Link Development Assistance to
Rights Obligations, NIKKEI WEEKLY, Apr. 12, 1993, at 20 (reporting that the Bangkok Decla-
ration, adopted by an Asian Regional Human Rights Preparatory Meeting for World Human
Rights Conference on April 5, 1993, emphasizes "non-interference in the internal affairs of
states and the non-use of human rights as an instrument of political pressure").
183. See ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY 146 (1992); see also
Marantis, supra note 142, at 2.
1244 [Vol. 24:1209
Articulating the Right
to a government; it only insists on a limitation on its powers, since the
opposite of constitutionalism is despotism.
84
This is not to say that democracy is a perfect system; it is not. In
fact, as this Article indicates, many democracies have failed in Africa as,
indeed, elsewhere. Even those surviving are sometimes too marked by
violence and intrigues as to warrant a sanguine view of the chances for
democracy. Nevertheless, these are not sufficient reasons to despair; at
any rate, it is wrong to judge a philosophy by its abuse. Pessimism con-
cerning the success of democracy enhances the likelihood that
nondemocratic forms of government will prevail.
Democracy "is not even a system of government that fully embodies
all democratic ideals, but one that approximates them to a reasonable
degree."'85 Ideologically, democracy is the only form of government that
currently enjoys legitimacy.' 6 Other than a small number of theocracies,
alternatives to democracy are rejected at both ideological and political
levels.' Democracy makes it possible, but by no means certain, that
human rights will be protected and secured. It validates emancipatory
change, and, alongside rationality, equality, and freedom, represents part
of "the deeply ambiguous legacy of modernity."'88
Research on wars among nations has also shown that democracies
almost never fight one another, and that "since 1816, no democracy has
fought another democracy. ' "9 It has also been shown that "the more
people in individual communities within a society participate in
community decisions, the less fighting there is among communities in that
society."' O9 The AU should consider this, particularly given the avalanche
of inter- and intrastate conflicts that plague the continent. Furthermore, it
is not true, as some insist, that development could be fostered under any
type of economic or political system-including an authoritarian regime.
Experience shows, to the contrary, that a democratic political system is
more conducive to economic development, as well as a necessary
184. See, e.g., B.O. NWABUEZE, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE EMERGENT STATES (1973).
185. AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORA-
TION 4 (1977).
186. See Samuel H. Barnes, The Contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Postconflict
Societies, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 86, 86-87 (2001) (exploring "what empirical social science has
to say about the design of democracy in the aftermath of conflicts"). Barnes also argues that
"the twentieth-century struggles between alternative political and economic ideologies have
largely subsided... "' Id. at 87.
187. See id. at 87.
188. Marks, supra note 167, at 78.
189. Jane Mansbridge, Politics, in THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY: PROCEEDINGS OF A
WORKSHOP, 5 (Comm'n on Behavioral & Soc. Sci. & Educ. ed., 1991).
190. Id.
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condition to sustainable economic development. '  It is generally
associated with economic well-being and is, thus, better placed to meet
"the most pressing social needs of citizens, particularly at moments of
crisis or displacement that most affect poor people." '92
The next Part examines how far African countries have gone in
erecting the normative infrastructures of democratic governance through
ratification of U.N.-inspired human rights instruments and the elabora-
tion of regional treaties, documents, and action plans.
IV. ERECTING DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN AFRICA
Collectively, African countries have come to accept democratic gov-
ernance as a basic right that they must advance. In the Addis Ababa
Declaration, 93 the OAU defined the right to democracy as the right of
peoples "to determine, in all sovereignty, their system of democracy on
the basis of their sociocultural values, taking into account the realities of
each of [the countries] and the necessity to ensure development and sat-
isfy the basic needs of [the] peoples."'94 This Part elaborates on this right,
from the various instruments that African leaders have collectively
adopted or ratified in recent memory. Some of the instruments to be con-
sidered are, of course, "soft" laws, defined as precepts emanating from
international bodies that conform in some sense to expectations of re-
quired behavior, but that are not binding on States.'95 However, when
frequently reiterated in subsequent textual practice, these declarations
and resolutions become "hard" law, acquiring some sort of customary
status.196 At the moment, they are norm candidates.'97
191. See NRC SUMMARY, supra note 114, at 1.
192. UNDP Report 2002, supra note 63, at v.
193. See OAU, Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and
the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World, adopted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on
July 11, 1990 [hereinafter Addis Ababa Decl.].
194. Id.
195. See Steven R. Ratner, International Law: The Trials of Global Norms, 110 FOREIGN
POL'Y 65, 67 (1998). However, as Malcolm Shaw observed, "a document.., does not need to
constitute a binding treaty before it can exercise an influence in international politics .... "
SHAW, supra note 4, at 93. See generally Christine M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law:
Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 850 (1989).
196. See Ratner, supra note 195, at 68 (arguing that soft law principles represent a start-
ing point for new hard law, which attaches a penalty to noncompliance).
197. A norm is a standard or principle of conduct that is deemed to be binding on the
members of a group and serves as an instrument to guide and regulate acceptable behavior
among those members. However, certain moral and legal principles or claims exist in
international law-as well as domestic law-as candidates for the office or status of standards
rather than as standards themselves. These legal-moral principles or claims are really
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This Part starts with relevant U.N.-inspired human rights instruments
that a large number of African countries have ratified. It is the logical
place to begin any discussion of various normative standards on democ-
ratic governance in Africa, since the U.N. is the cradle of contemporary
international protection of human rights. The paper, thereafter, looks at
"home-grown" African human rights and related instruments.
A. Adoption and Ratification of Relevant U.N.
Human Rights Instruments by African States
Several African countries are parties to several U.N.-inspired human
rights and related instruments incorporating, directly or indirectly, the
right to democratic governance.
1. The U.N. Charter
All independent African countries-fifty-four at the moment-are,
parties to the Charter of the United Nations. Although the Charter is an
organization of States, it is written in the name of "the peoples," an ac-
knowledgement that ultimate sovereignty lies with the people, not the
States. The Charter reaffirms the dignity and worth of the human person,
dignity being the common denominator of our very humanity. It reaf-
firms respect for human rights, and the equal rights of men and women.
It is a commitment to social progress, measured by better living stan-
dards for the world's peoples, free from want and fear alike. These,
undoubtedly, are ingredients of good governance.
The U.N. Charter also proclaims "the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples,"'98 which is stated as the basis for friendly
relations among nations. 99 Similarly, under the now irrelevant provisions
regarding non-self-governing territories, administering States pledged to
"develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations
of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their
free political institutions. ' '2°° Self-determination "has evolved into a more
general notion of internationally validated political consultation, one that
is beginning to be applied even to independent (postcolonial) States
nominees offered by nation-states to potential voters, that is, the States. These moral and legal
principles we call norm candidates. Although many such candidates are sometimes offered,
not many are chosen as norms; and even when some are chosen, that choice often takes many
years. See W.F. Langley, Children as Subjects of International Law: The Conquest of the
Ideology of Care-Taking, REV. INT'L AFF. 40, 43 (1999).
198. U.N. CHARTER art. 1(2).
199. See id.
200. Id. art. 73.
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.,,2o, It enjoys primacy in international law, acquiring the status of jus
cogens-that is, a peremptory norm of international law from which no
derogation is permitted.2 2
The U.N., over the years, has undertaken and supported several
measures to promote and protect the right of self-determination, espe-
cially by encouraging and accelerating the attainment of independence
by colonial African countries.
2. The UDHR and ICCPR
Although the majority of African States were not yet independent
during the time of adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) in 1948,203 at least one African country-Egypt-was
involved in its deliberative processes, as a member of the Commission
20
on Human Rights. In any event, almost all African countries have now
incorporated its principles into their respective national constitutions, as
have all civilized countries.
The UDHR was adopted "as a common standard of achievement for
all peoples and all nations."' 5 It provides for the right to democratic gov-
ernance in these words: "Everyone has the right to take part in the
government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representa-
tives. ' ' More importantly, the UDHR proclaims the maxim vox populi
suprema lex, by providing that "[t]he will of the people shall be the basis
of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic
201. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, supra note 116, at 55.
202. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 53, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The Vienna Convention provides:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm
of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremp-
tory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the
international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general interna-
tional law having the same character.
Id. Note that while some jurists ground jus cogens in either convention or custom, other publi-
cists would only accept custom and general principles of law as possible sources. For an
excellent review of these arguments, see Robert Kolb, The Formal Source of lus Cogens in
Public International Law, 53 Aus. J. PUB. INT'L L. 69 (1998).
203. See UDHR, supra note 77.
204. See B.G. Ramcharan, A Debate About Power Rather Than Rights, 4 INT'L POL. &
Soc. 423-24 (1998) (asserting also that the Commission drew upon the constitutions and
legislations of fifty-five countries "as the basis of its work in drafting the declaration").
205. UDHR, supra note 77, pmbl., 8.
206. Id. art. 21(1).
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and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage andr. .. t ,,201
shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.
Though the UDHR is not a legally enforceable instrument, it has be-
come "the principal conduit for bringing the idea of human rights into
the life of many nations .... Some have also argued that many of its
provisions "constitute general principles of law or represent elementary
considerations of humanity. '" 209
The adoption of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) in 1966 crystallized the floating human rights ideals
enunciated in the UDHR. It gave legal force to the UDHR, making the
rights enshrined in the Declaration concrete, fixed, more precise, and
sacrosanct. Significantly, several African countries are parties to this
Covenant. As of June 13, 2002, forty-five African States had ratified the
Covenant, while three countries-Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sao Tome
and Principe-had signed but not yet ratified it.
2 10
The ICCPR is the most significant universal human rights instrument
incorporating the principles of democratic governance, one of which is
the right to self-determination of peoples. It provides that "[a]ll peoples
have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development."
2
'1
207. Id. art. 21(3).
208. Louis Henkin, The International Bill of Rights: The Universal Declaration and the
Covenants, in INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (Rudolf Bernhardt &
John Anthony Jolowicz eds., 1987). For a general commentary on the provisions of the
UDHR, see THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY (Asbjom
Eide et al. eds., 1992).
209. BROWNLIE, supra note 9, at 575; see also John Humphrey, The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and Judicial Character, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY
YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 21, 29 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1979) (asserting
that, "in addition to their admitted moral and political authority, the justiciable provisions of
the Declaration, including certainly, those enunciated in articles two to twenty-one inclusive,
have now acquired the force of lav as part of the customary law of nations"); Mary Glendon,
Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1153 (1998)
(noting that the UDHR "is already showing signs of having achieved the status of a holy writ
within the human rights movement" and that "[c]lubs have formed around selected provisions
[of the UDHR]").
210. See Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties
(Dec. 9, 2002), at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2003) [hereinafter
Status of Ratifications] (providing status of ratification by treaty).
211. ICCPR, supra note 77, art. l(l), 999 U.N.T.S. 173, 6 I.L.M. 369; cf. ICESCR,
supra note 78, art. 1(1), 993 U.N.T.S. 5, 6 I.L.M. 360. The current debate about self-
determination regards how international law should protect the rights of minorities within a
political system. The problem of national, racial, ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities
constitutes currently one of the most burning issues on the international human rights agenda.
Modem human rights has matured; while it once considered only the idea of simple majority
rule and political rights for all, it now takes into consideration the interests of minorities who
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The ICCPR also guarantees the right to freedom of expression,' as-
sembly,2" and association.2 4 More importantly, every citizen is
guaranteed the right and the opportunity, without any discrimination or
unreasonable restriction:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or indi-
rectly through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by se-
cret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the
electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public ser-
vice in his country."5
The key words in the above provisions, as in the UDHR, include
"representatives" and "freely chosen." Similarly, the "will" of the people
must be expressed in elections, which must be "periodic" and must be
"genuine." The Covenant also demands for "secret ballot," though the
UDHR uses "equivalent free voting procedure." Finally, such election
must be by "universal and equal suffrage." These rights may, of course,
be derogated, but only in exceptional circumstances, such as "[i]n time
of public emergency that threatens the life of the nation."26 Such public
emergency must, however, be officially proclaimed. 2" Besides, the
experience difficulty in making bodies of power consider their special position and interests.
See Maxim Smyslov, Book Review, 4 EuR. J. INT'L L. 137 (1993) (reviewing PATRICK
THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES (1991)). A minority in
this context could be defined as a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population, in a
non-dominant position, consisting of nationals of the State, possessing distinct ethnic,
religious or linguistic characteristics and showing a sense of solidarity aimed at preserving
those characteristics. See Francesco Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, $ 568, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev. 1, U.N.
Sales No. E.78XIV.I (1979). See generally PEOPLES' RIGHTS (Philip Alston ed., 2001); THE
RIGHTS OF PEOPLES (James Crawford ed., 1988); ZELIM SKURBATY, As IF PEOPLES
MATTERED: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF 'PEOPLES' AND 'MINORITIES' FROM THE
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE AND BEYOND (2000); Caroline Foster,
Articulating Self-determination in the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 141 (2001).
212. ICCPR, supra note 77, art. 19, 999 U.N.T.S. 178, 6 I.L.M. 374.
213. Id. art. 21, 999 U.N.T.S. 178, 6 I.L.M. 374.
214. Id. art. 22, 999 U.N.T.S. 178, 6 I.L.M. 374-75.
215. Id. art. 25, 999 U.N.T.S. 179, 6 I.L.M. 375. For a general commentary on the provi-
sions of the ICCPR, including those on democratic governance considered above, see
MANFRED NOWAK, UN COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENT
(1993).
216. ICCPR, supra note 77, art. 4(l), 999 U.N.T.S. 174, 993 I.L.M. 369-70.
217. See id.
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derogation measures must not entail breaches of the State Parties' other
obligations under international law.28
The ICCPR imposes immediate and readily identifiable obligations on
State Parties. For example, each party "undertakes"-an obligation of
conduct 2'9- "to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitu-
tional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt
such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the
rights recognized in the present Covenant. '20 State Parties also undertake
to ensure that an effective remedy is available for violations of the rights
enshrined in, the Covenant; to provide for determination of claims by
"competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities;" and "to en-
force such remedies when granted."22' The ICCPR particularly mandates
State Parties to "promote the realization of the right to self-determination,"
and to respect it in conformity with the U.N. Charter.
22
3. Other Multilateral Human Rights Instruments
African countries have ratified other multilateral human rights
instruments which, inter alia, guarantee the right to democratic
governance. These include the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Race Convention)223
and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW).2 4 Forty-seven African States have ratified the
Race Convention, while three-Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, and Sao Tome
and Principe-have signed but not yet ratified.2  Under the Race
Convention, States agree to guarantee equality before the law with respect
to a wide range of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, and
to prohibit and penalize the dissemination of propaganda based on the idea
of racial superiority or that incite racial hatred. They also commit
themselves "to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy
218. See id.
219. See Egon Schwelb, The Nature of Obligations of the States Parties to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in AMICORUM DISCIPULORUMQUE LIBER: PROBLEMS DE
PROTECION INTERNATIONALE DE DROITS DE L'HOMME 302 (Rend Cassin ed., 1969); see also
Anja Seibert-Fohr, Domestic Implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights Pursuant to Its Article 2 T[2 (sic), 5 MAX PLANCK YB. UNITED NATIONS L. 399, 402
(2001).
220. See ICCPR, supra note 77, art. 2(2), 999 U.N.T.S. 173-74, 6 I.L.M. 369.
221. See id. art. 2(3), 999 U.N.T.S. 174, 6 I.L.M. 369.
222. See id. art. 1(3), 999 U.N.T.S. 173, 6 1.L.M. 369.
223. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Race Convention].
224. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter CEDAW].
225. See also Status of Ratifications, supra note 210.
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of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting
understanding among all races. 226
Similarly, forty-eight African States have ratified the CEDAW,227 often
described as an international bill of rights for women. The Convention
condemns discrimination against women in all its forms. It provides the
basis for realizing equality between women and men through ensuring
women's equal access to, and equal opportunities in, political and public
life-including the right to vote and to stand for election-as well as edu-
cation, health, and employment. 8
Many African countries also participated in and, in fact, were influen-
tial to, the adoption of the U.N. Declaration on the Right to
Development."9 Aspects of the Declaration are relevant to the discourse on
the right to democratic governance. The Declaration, inter alia, requires
States "to formulate appropriate national development policies that aim at
the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of
all individuals, on the basis of their active, free, and meaningful participa-
tion in development and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting
there from.2 3° States also "undertake, at the national level, all necessary
measures for the realization of the right to development" and agree to "en-
sure, inter alia, equality of opportunity for all in their access to basic
resources, education, health services, food, housing, employment and the
fair distribution of income." '23
226. See Race Convention, supra note 223, art. 2(1).
227. See Status of Ratifications, supra note 210.
228. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPEC-
TIVES (Rebecca Cook ed., 1994) (showing the multiplicity of problems and perspectives on
issues affecting women and linking them with efforts to have human rights instruments applied
correctly in order to repair the gender-based injustice experienced by women).
229. See United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N.
GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986) [hereinafter Declaration on
Development]; Nsongurua Udombana, The Third World and the Right to Development: Agenda
for the Next Millennium, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 753 (2000) [hereinafter The Third World].
230. Declaration on Development, supra note 229, art. 2(3).
231. Id. art. 8(l).
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B. African Regional Instruments and Action
Plans on Democratic Governance
1. The African Charter and Commission
on Human and Peoples' Rights
The African Charter232 was the first major collective effort towards
taking human rights seriously in Africa. 33 It was the first significant
attempt by African States to defeat the "efforts by votaries of sovereignty
and the domain reserve to shield abuse of human rights by State officials
through the argument that how a State treats its nationals was its
exclusive business. 234 The Charter guarantees civil and political rights,235
economic, social, and cultural rights236 as well as group or peoples'
rights.237 It guarantees to every citizen "the right to participate freely in
the government of his country, either directly or through freely chosen
representatives in accordance with the provisions of the law." 38 The
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights ("African
Commission")-the only existing regional mechanism for the
implementation of the African Charter 239-has interpreted the Charter's
provisions broadly. Thus, according to the Commission, the right to free
participation entails, inter alia, the right to vote for the representative of
one's choice and a duty to respect the results of that choice, since a
breach of that duty will render the right of free expression of the will of
the voters meaningless.2 0
The African Charter contains the important right to self-
determination. According to the Charter, "[a]ll peoples shall have the
right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and inalienable
right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political
status and shall pursue their economic and social development according
232. See AFRICAN CHARTER, supra note 80.
233. See Can a Leopard Change Its Spots?, supra note 30, at 1207, 1206-67 (also describ-
ing the Charter as "presumably Africa's trumpet of liberty blowing over the land of the living").
234. Oyebode, supra note 140, at 86.
235. See AFRICAN CHARTER, supra note 80, arts. 2-13.
236. See id. arts. 14-18.
237. See id. arts. 19-23.
238. Id. art. 13.
239. The mandate of the Commission includes the promotion and protection of human
rights and interpretation of the Charter at the request of States Parties or African Intergovem-
mental Institutions. See id. arts. 30 & 45.
240. Communication 102/93, Constitutional Rights Project and Civil Liberties Organi-
sation v. Nigeria (Afr. Comm'n), in TWELFTH ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT, supra note 35,
50, 53 [hereinafter Communication 102/93] (holding that the annulment of results of a free
and fair election in Nigeria, adjudged to be free and fair by international observers, was a
violation of article 13(1) of the African Charter).
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to the policy they have freely chosen. 2 4' The right of a people to deter-
mine their "political status" is a counterpart of article 13 and involves
the right of citizens to be able to choose freely those persons or party
that will govern them.2' Government by force is incompatible with the
rights of peoples to freely determine their political future. Consequently,
any forcible conquest of government by any group contravenes articles
13(1) and 20(1) of the Charter.13 Indeed, the Charter declares a further
right to liberation from the bonds of domination,2'" which, it is submit-
ted, is not limited to colonial situations but should be extended to include
internal domination by whatever shape and form, including military re-
gimes. For such "liberation struggles," the Charter enjoins assistance
from other State Parties.245
The Charter guarantees the independence of the courts. This is
crucial, since courts are vanguards of the democratic process and the
bastion of the protection of the rights of individuals against the abuses of
State power.4 6 The Charter provides that "States Parties to the present
Charter shall have the duty to guarantee the independence of the courts
and shall allow the establishment and improvement of appropriate
national institutions entrusted with the promotion and protection of the
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the present Charter."2 47 The African
Commission has held that article 26 of the African Charter speaks of the
institutions that are essential to give meaning and content to the rights,
and clearly envisions the protection of the courts. 8 Under the General
Guidelines Regarding the Form and Contents of Reports from States on
Civil and Political Rights, issued by the Commission, 249 each state party
to the African Charter must report, inter alia, on "[w]hat judicial,
administrative or other authorities have jurisdiction affecting human and
241. AFRICAN CHARTER, supra note 80, art. 20(l) (emphasis added).
242. See Communication 102/93, supra note 240, 1 52.
243. See Resolution on the Military, supra note 122, pmbl., 1 4.
244. See AFRICAN CHARTER, supra note 80, art. 20(2).
245. Id. art. 20(3).
246. See, e.g., Communication 129/94, Civil Liberties Organization v. Nigeria, in NINTH
ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT 1995-96, Annex VIII, 1 14 [hereinafter Communication 129/94].
247. AFRICAN CHARTER, supra note 80, art. 26.
248. See Communication 129/94, supra note 246, at 14.
249. See AFR. COMM'N, SECOND ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT OF THE AFRICAN COMMIS-
SION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS, ANNEX X: COMMISSION GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL
PERIODIC REPORTS, pt. I (adopted on June 14, 1989), reprinted in II HUM. RTS. L.J. 390, 405-
07. The guidelines were issued pursuant to the African Charter, supra note 80, art. 62 (provid-
ing that "[elach State Party shall undertake to submit every two years, from the date the
present Charter comes into force, a report on the legislative or other measures taken with a
view to giving effect to the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed by the present
Charter").
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peoples' rights,, 250 and "[w]hat remedies are available to an individual
whose rights are violated."25' Significantly, the African Charter, unlike
most other human rights treaties, does not permit any derogation of the
rights in any circumstance.
Generally, civil and political rights are predicated on the rule of law,
and the rule of law presupposes a form of organization that limits and
controls authority to safeguard freedom.252 These rights find their utmost
expressions under constitutional democracies, as opposed to military
regimes or one-party dictatorships that clothe government with omnipo-
tence. As the African Commission observed, "the best government is one
elected by, and accountable to, the people., 253 Aristotle wrote several
centuries ago that:
He who commands that law should rule may thus be regarded as
commanding that God and reason alone should rule; [but] he
who commands that a man should rule adds the character of the
beast. Appetite has that character; and ... perverts the holders of
office, even when they are the best of men.254
The African Charter adds a catalogue of political duties, which are at
the core of political participation, and which the Charter describes as
"the obligation of solidarity." 255 It provides that "[e]very individual shall
have duties towards ... society, the State and other legally recognized
communities and the international community.' ' 56 He shall also have the
duty, inter alia,
[T]o serve his national community by placing his physical and
intellectual abilities at its service; [n]ot to compromise the secu-
rity of the State whose national or resident he is; [t]o preserve
and strengthen social and national solidarity, particularly when
the latter is threatened; [and] [p]reserve and strengthen the na-
250. Id. 4(iii).
251. Id. 4(iv).
252. See Promotion and Consolidation of Democracy, supra note 113, 14 (citing
Manuel Arag6n Reyes, Estado y Democracia (State and Democracy), in MANUEL ARAG6N
REYES, ET AL., EL DERECHO PUBLICO DE FINALES DE SIGNO: UNA PERSPECTIVA IBEROAMERI-
CANA 43 (1997)).
253. See Resolution on the Military, supra note 122, pmbl., para. 2.
254. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE, bk. III, ch. XVI, 1287a (E. Barker trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1968); cf C.S. Lewis, Membership, in THE WEIGHT OF GLORY 126
(Touchstone 1996) (1949) (asserting that the true ground of democracy is the belief that "men
[are] so wicked that not one of them can be trusted with any irresponsible power over his fel-
lows*").
255. AFRICAN CHARTER, supra note 80, art. 10(2).
256. Id. art. 27(1).
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tional independence and the territorial integrity of his country
and contribute to its defence in accordance with the law ....
He must also preserve and strengthen positive African values in his rela-
tions with other members of the society, in the spirit of tolerance,
dialogue and consultation and, in general, contribute to the promotion of
the moral well-being of society; and contribute to the best of his abili-
ties, at all times and at all levels, to the promotion and achievement of
African unity.
258
The African Commission also has developed a number of soft laws,
in the form of resolutions, to complement the normative provisions of
the Charter. Few of these touch on the right to democratic governance
but the foremost of them is the Commission's Resolution on Electoral
Process and Participatory Governance, adopted during the Commission's
Nineteenth Ordinary Session at Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso in 1996.29
The resolution affirmed and asserted that "elections are the only means
by which the people can elect democratically the government of their
choice in conformity to the African Charter .... ,260 It called on states
party to the Charter to take necessary measures to preserve and protect
the credibility of the electoral process,26 including the presence of na-
tional and international observers during the elections. Access to the
electoral process and personal safety should be guaranteed, to enable
such observers to fulfill their mission and prepare their report on elec-
tions in a proper manner.262 The resolution ordered African countries and
institutions to participate in observation of elections in State Parties.26 It
emphasized that States Parties should provide those tasked with organiz-
ing elections with "adequate material resources and any items necessary
for the preparation and holding of elections."264
2. The Addis Ababa Declaration
The OAU adopted the Addis Ababa Declaration in 1990.265 The Dec-
laration acknowledged that the promotion of popular participation of
257. See id. art. 29.
258. Id.
259. See Resolution on Electoral Process and Participatory Governance [hereinafter
Resolution on Electoral Process], in RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESOLUTIONS, supra note 122,
at 34.
260. Id. 1.
261. Id. 3.
262. See id.
263. Id. 5.
264. Id. 91 4.
265. See Addis Ababa Declaration, supra note 193.
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African people in the process of government and development would
facilitate the process of socioeconomic transformation and integration of
the continent.266 Consequently, a
political environment which guarantees human rights and the
observance of the rule of law, would assure high standards of
probity and accountability particularly on the part of those who
hold public office. In addition, popular-based political processes
would ensure the involvement of all including in particular
women and youth in the development efforts. We accordingly
recommit ourselves to the further democratisation of our socie-
ties and to the consolidation of democratic institutions in our
261
countries.
3. The Algiers Declaration
In 1999, the OAU carried its democracy crusade to Algiers, with the
adoption of the Algiers Declaration.2 68 The Declaration reflected on the
demise of colonialism in Africa and stressed that the struggle for inde-
pendence "contributed significantly in inculcating in the peoples and
nations of the continent the universal principles of the right of peoples to
be the architect of their own destiny.' 269 It noted the positive changes that
human rights have undergone since African States attained political in-
dependence, such as the liberation movements and the codification and
implementation of a number of human rights instruments.2 0 The Decla-
ration, however, admitted "much remains to be done to bring these
developments to the level of our own expectations and the legitimate
aspirations of our peoples."27' Nevertheless, Affican leaders pledged their
determination to transcend these problems.272
The Declaration reiterated the OAU's commitment to protect and
promote human rights and fundamental freedoms.273 It emphasized the
indivisibility, universality, and interdependence of all human rights,
whether they are political and civil, economic, social, and cultural, indi-
vidual, or collective. More importantly, African leaders expressed their
conviction that
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Algiers Declaration, supra note 18.
269. Id. para. 2.
270. Id.
271. Id. para. 16.
272. Id.
273. See id. para. 17.
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the increase in, and expansion of the spaces of freedom and the
establishment of democratic institutions that are representative
of our peoples and receiving their active participation, would
further contribute to the consolidation of modern African States
underpinned by the rule of law, respect for the fundamental
rights and freedoms of the citizens and the democratic manage-
ment of public affairs. 74
4. The Lome Declaration
The Lome Declaration was adopted at the Thirty-sixth Ordinary Ses-
sion of the OAU Assembly in Lome, Togo, in July, 2000.275 The
Declaration lamented the many woes that have befallen Africa over the
years. These inflictions include conflicts and acts of violence, 6 the prob-
lem of refugees and internal displacements, 277 and the deterioration of the
prices of raw materials and the obstacles to international trade.278 Others
are the indebtedness of African countries;2 79 and cross-border crime in-
cluding trafficking of small arms and light weapons, drug trafficking,
corruption, and terrorism. 2' ° The Declaration recognized that poverty,
hunger, disease, injustice, illiteracy, and war constitute major impedi-
ments to the development and advancement of African citizens;21' and
that "development, democracy, respect for fundamental freedoms and
human rights, good governance, tolerance, [and a] culture of peace are
essential prerequisites for the establishment and maintenance of peace,
security and stability.
282
The Declaration was not all a tale of woes, for the OAU Assembly
also plotted ways out of these "pothole and gully" indexes. Of particular
relevance was their commitment "to continue to promote respect and
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy, rule
274. Id. para. 18.
275. Lome Declaration, OAU Doc. AHG/Decl.2 (XXXVI) (July 12, 2000), at http://
www.uneca.org/itca/ariportal/lome.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Lome
Declaration].
276. Id. pmbl.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. (pointing out also that such indebtedness has "negative effect[s] on African
economies" and decrying "the persistent decline of ODA [official development assistance] and
investments").
280. Id. (stressing that such acts threaten the security and stability of Africa, and hamper
its economic and social development).
281. Id. African leaders were also concerned about the worsening plight of millions of
African children due to war, their conscription for armed conflicts, and general exploitation.
282. Id..
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of law and good governance in our countries.,, 2" This is probably a
statement that is born out of experience, as Africa has experienced crisis
of security for more than four decades mainly due to political instability.
They have, thus, acknowledged that there can be no peace without de-
mocracy. The OAU also pledged to reduce poverty in Africa, as part of
the implementation of the Plan of Action pursuant to the Libreville
Summit Declaration, and the Social Summit of Copenhagen.284
5. The Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response
to Unconstitutional Changes of Government
Coup d'etat, as noted earlier, have been a major problem in Africa,285
causing political, economic and social problems for the continent and its
peoples.286 The Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to
Unconstitutional Changes of Government was adopted in 2000 as an
expression of concern by the OAU over the problem of coup d'etat in
Africa.2 7 The Declaration proclaims a continent-wide commitment to
democracy and attempts to give substance to that commitment by setting
out "common values and principles for democratic governance [in Afri-
can countries]." '288 It firmly rejects unconstitutional change in government
as "an unacceptable and anachronistic act, which is in contradiction of
our commitment to promote democratic principles and conditions. 289
The Declaration articulated certain common values and principles
for democratic governance in Africa. These are:
(i) adoption of a democratic Constitution: its preparation, content
and method of revision should be in conformity with generally
acceptable principles of democracy; (ii) respect for the Constitu-
tion and adherence to the provisions of the law and other
legislative enactments adopted by Parliament; (iii) separation of
powers and independence of the judiciary; (iv) promotion of po-
litical pluralism or any other form of participatory democracy
283. Id. 13.
284. Id. 17.
285. See Resolution on the Military, supra note 122, pmbl., para. 1 ("Recalling the inter-
vention in African States by the military during the past three decades, and the fact that only
very few states have escaped this phenomenon...").
286. See id. pmbl. para. 5 (noting that military interventions "stultify political develop-
ment and antagonize relations between national groups").
287. See Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional
Changes of Government, OAU Doc. AHG/Decl. 5 (XXXVI) (2000), at http://esa.un.org/ffd/
policydb/PolicyTexts/aec-l .htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Declaration on Un-
constitutional Changes].
288. Id.
289. Id.
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and the role of the African civil society, including enhancing and
ensuring gender balance in the political process; (v) the principle
of democratic change and recognition of a role for the opposi-
tion; (vi) organization of free and regular elections, in
conformity with existing texts; (vii) [the] guarantee of freedom
of expression and freedom of the press, including guaranteeing
access to the media for all political stake-holders;
(viii) constitutional recognition of fundamental rights and free-
doms in conformity with the [UDHR and the African Charter];
[and] (ix) [the] guarantee and promotion of human rights.2
African leaders defined the situations that constitute an unconstitu-
tional change of government as the following:
(i) military coup d'etat against a democratically elected Gov-
ernment; (ii) intervention by mercenaries to replace a
democratically elected Government; (iii) replacement of democ-
ratically elected Governments by armed dissident groups and
rebel movements; [and] (iv) the refusal by an incumbent gov-
ernment to relinquish power to the winning party after free, fair,
and regular elections.29" '
The occurrence of any of these situations should trigger a number of
actions. 292 First, the Secretary-General of the OAU "should immediately
and publicly condemn such a change and urge the speedy return to con-
stitutional order.' '293 Second, he "should also convey a clear and
unequivocal warning to the perpetrators of the unconstitutional change
that, under no circumstances, will their illegal action be tolerated or rec-
ognized by the OAU. 2 94 The OAU appears to be firmly committed not to
seat a delegation sent by the usurping regime.29 ' Furthermore, the Chair-
man of the OAU, the Secretary-General of the OAU, or any Member
State can request a meeting of the OAU Central Organ to condemn the
unconstitutional change. 6 If the Central Organ condemns the change, a
six-month period is given to the usurpers to restore constitutional gov-
ernment.29 ' During this period, "the government concerned should be
290. Id.
29!. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See id.
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suspended from participating in the Policy Organs of the OAU. '2 98
Where, however, there is no restoration of constitutional order after six
months, "a range of limited and targeted sanctions against the regime
that stubbornly refuses to restore constitutional order should be insti-
tuted." 9 The Declaration established a Sanctions Subcommittee of the
General Organ to monitor compliance with decisions of the Central Or-
gan.3° It should be noted that virtually all of these steps appear to be
mandatory-the Declaration provides that actions "should" be taken, as
opposed to "may.
' 30
'
The import of this Declaration will better be appreciated by looking
at the practice of states in recent times. Prior to the above Declaration,
some sub-regional groupings in Africa had begun to react adversely and,
sometimes, violently, to attempted or actual unconstitutional changes of
government in neighboring countries. The activities of the Economic
Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) de-
serve special emphasis.32 The ECOMOG has been described as "a
unique example of intervention on a multilateral basis in Liberia and
Sierra Leone. 3°3 On May 25, 1997, for example, some rebel groups in
Sierra Leone, led by a group of military officers, staged a coup and
forcibly took power from the legitimate government of Tejan Kabbah. °M
On February 12, 1998, the ECOMOG succeeded, after six days of fierce
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. See id.
301. See id.
302. See generally REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT:
THE LIBERIAN CRISIS (M. Weller ed., 1994) (describing how the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS), originally designed as a subregional organization for the
pursuit of economic and social goals, became involved in an internal conflict within Liberia,
eventually helping to resolve the conflict through the establishment of the ECOWAS Mediat-
ing Standing Committee in 1990). The text further notes that not all ECOWAS members
participated in the force, though decisions, which included calling for a cease-fire between the
warring parties and establishing a cease-fire observing force called the ECOWAS Military
Observer Group (subsequently approved by the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government),
were taken on behalf of the Authority of the Heads of State and Government. Id.; see also
Edward Kwakwa, Internal Conflicts in Africa: Is there a Right of Humanitarian Action?, 2
AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 9 (1994) (examining the law and policy issues involved in situations where
there is internal conflict within a domestic jurisdiction and the international community inter-
venes).
303. Adebayo Adedeji, Comprehending African Conflicts, in COMPREHENDING AND
MASTERING AFRICAN CONFLICTS 3 (Adebayo Adedeji ed., 1999).
304. See AMNESTY INT'L REPORT 1998, at 298 (1998) (reporting on how the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), which took power in May 1997, was subsequently
joined by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and on how these rebels "assumed extensive
powers of detention, without safeguards against arbitrary arrest or indefinite detention without
charge or trial.").
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battle, in crushing the rebellion and restoring Kabbah to power. The U.N.
Security Council later endorsed ECOMOG's activities in Sierra Leone:
Space does not permit other illustrative cases; suffice it to mention
the mass and violent reaction to the attempted overthrow of a democratic
government in C6te d'Ivoire a few years ago. Another recent attempt to
truncate democratic rule in this unfortunate African country was met
with international condemnation.3°6 It may be predicted that Africa is
likely to witness more mass protests and multilateral interventions in the
future in order to secure democratic entitlements. This points to a crys-
tallization of the right to democratic governance in Africa. Africa is
slowly but surely entering a brave new world "in which the citizens of
each State will look to international law and organization to guarantee
their democratic entitlement.
'3 °07
6. The African Union Act
African leaders adopted the AU Act on July 11, 2000308 to replace the
OAU Charter.3°9 The Act establishes the AU as a political, economic, and
social organization, and provides the basis of its operation. The AU is
established "to take up the multifaceted challenges that confront [the Af-
rican] continent and peoples in the light of the social, economic, and
political changes taking place in the world."' 0 It is established, in par-
ticular, "to accelerate the process of implementing the Treaty
establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) in order to pro-
mote the socio-economic development of Africa and to face more
effectively the challenges posed by globalization."3 ' Its architects claim
they are guided by a "common vision of a united and strong Africa and
by the need to build a partnership between governments and all segments
305. See S.C. Res. 1132, U.N. SCOR, 3822d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/i 132 (1997).
306. See, e.g., Communiqud I G(4), in EIGHTY-SIXTH ORDINARY SESSION OF THE CEN-
TRAL ORGAN OF THE MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND
RESOLUTION AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL, A.U. Doc. Central Organ/MEC/AMB/Comm.
(LXXXVI) (2002), at http://www.africa-union.org/News-Events/Communiquds/86th%20
Communique%20_- Eng_%2029-10-02.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2003) ("welcoming the Deci-
sion of the Summit of Heads of State and Government of the ECOWAS Contact Group held in
Abidjan on 23 October 2002, for the rapid deployment of a Monitoring Group to supervise the
cessation of hostilities and maintain a climate conducive to dialogue between the Government
and the assailants."). The communiqud also "appealed to the International Community to pro-
vide ECOWAS with all the necessary assistance to facilitate the successful conclusion of its
peace efforts, particularly by providing the requisite logistics and financial assistance for the
deployment of the Monitoring Group." Id. I G(7).
307. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, supra note 116, at 50.
308. See AU Act, supra note 10.
309. Id. art. 33(l), 2000 AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 479, 490.
310. Id. pmbl., para. 5, at 481-82.
311. Id. pmbl., para. 6, at 482.
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of civil society, in particular women, youth and the private sector in or-
der to strengthen solidarity and cohesion among [African] peoples. 32
Significantly, the AU promises to ensure good governance and the
rule of law, to "promote and protect human and peoples' rights, [and to]
consolidate democratic institutions and culture."3 3 It also promises to
"take all necessary measures" to strengthen common African institu-
tions, and to provide them with the necessary powers and resources that
would enable them [to] discharge their respective mandates effec-
tively.' 314 These are wonderful promises, but past experiences make them
sound hollow. It is true that African governments have established many
democratic institutions, such as the judiciary and the media; but it is
equally true, and far more self-evident, that African rulers have so emas-
culated these institutions as to render them useless. They seem more
comfortable with weak rather than strong democratic institutions! Thus,
it will require more than rhetoric to resuscitate and strengthen these in-
stitutions for optimal performance.
The AU Act contains many aims, some of which relate to democratic
governance, such as the promotion of peace, security, and stability on the
continent,' and the promotion of democratic principles and institutions,
popular participation, and good governance." 6 The Union will also pro-
mote and protect human and peoples' rights, as articulated in the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights
instruments. 317 It will promote cooperation in all fields of human en-
deavor, in order to raise the living standards of African peoples, 3, an
implicit acknowledgement that living standards are low in the continent.
Among the principles that will underpin the AU's activities are the
participation of all the African peoples in the activities of the Union;3 9
promotion of gender equality;320 and respect for democratic principles,
human rights, the rule of law, and good governance.32 Other important
principles are the promotion of social justice to ensure balanced eco-
nomic development;... respect for the sanctity of human life, and the
condemnation of political assassination-which has become a defining
312. Id. pmbl., para. 7.
313. Id. pmbl., para. 9.
314. Id. pmbl., para. 10.
315. See id. art. 3(f), at 484.
316. Id. art. 3(g).
317. Id. art. 3(h).
318. Id. art. 3(k).
319. Id. art. 4(c).
320. Id. art. 4(l), at 485.
321. Id. art. 4(m).
322. Id. art. 4(n).
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feature of politics in many African counties such as Nigeria-, acts of
321terrorism, and subversive activities. States party to the Act must con-
demn and reject unconstitutional changes of governments.324  In
particular, "[g]overnments which shall come to power through unconsti-
tutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the
Union 32, The rejection of unconstitutional forms of government is on its
way to becoming customary international law in Africa.
Significantly, the AU Act establishes a Pan-African Parliament
(PAP) "to ensure the full participation of African peoples in the devel-
opment and economic integration of the continent." '326 The Protocol on
the Parliament has already been adopted,327 in accordance with the Act.328
The Protocol, which will enter into force after the deposit of the instru-
ments of ratification by a simple majority of the Member States,329
establishes the PAP to "represent all the peoples of Africa."33 The ulti-
mate aim of the PAP is to develop "an institution with full legislative
powers, whose members are elected by universal adult suffrage. 33'
The PAP will facilitate the effective implementation of the policies
and objectives of the AEC and the AU as well as cooperation and devel-
opment in Africa. 32 It will promote the principles of human rights and
democracy in Africa and encourage good governance, transparency, and
accountability in Member States. 33 The PAP will also familiarize the
peoples of Africa with those objectives and policies that seek to integrate
Africa within the framework of the establishment of the AU; promote
peace, security, and stability; contribute to a prosperous future for the
peoples of Africa by promoting collective self-reliance and economic
recovery; strengthen continental solidarity and build a sense of common
323. Id. art. 4(o).
324. Id. art. 4(p).
325. Id. art. 30, at 493.
326. Id. art. 17(1), at 490.
327. See Protocol to the AEC Treaty to establish the Pan-African Parliament, Assembly
Decision EAHG/Dec.2 (V) (2001) [hereinafter PAP Protocol]. Twenty-one Member States
have so far signed the Protocol while three countries have ratified it. See Transition from the
OAU to the African Union, at http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/background/oau-to-au.htm (last
visited July 15, 2003).
328. See AU Act, supra note 10, art. 17(2), 2000 AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 479, 490.
329. See PAP Protocol, supra note 327, art. 22.
330. Id. art. 2(2).
331. Id. art. 2(3).
332. Id. art. 3. For an analysis of the PAP and other institutions of the AU, see Nsongu-
rua Udombana, The Institutional Structure of the African Union: A Legal Analysis, 33 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 69, 101 (2002) [hereinafter Institutional Structure].
333. Institutional Structure, supra note 332.
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destiny among the peoples of Africa; and facilitate cooperation among
Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Parliamentary fora.
34
7. The New Partnership for Africa's Development
On October 23, 2001, African leaders, meeting in Abuja, Nigeria,
launched "a development strategy" known as the New Partnership for
Africa's Development (NEPAD). 3 Described as "a holistic, comprehen-
sive integrated strategic framework for the socio-economic development
of Africa,, 336 NEPAD seeks to give impetus to African development by
bridging gaps between the continent and the developed world. It pro-
vides the vision for Africa, a statement of the problems facing the
continent, and a Program of Action to tackle the problems in order to
337
attain the beatific vision.
Through the partnership, African leaders have agreed to strengthen
mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, and resolution; pro-
mote and protect democracy and human rights by developing standards
for accountability; run a transparent and participatory government; re-
store and maintain macroeconomic stability; implement transparent legal
and regulatory frameworks for financial markets; revitalize and extend
education, technical training, and health care services; promote women's
role in social and economic development; and promote the development
of infrastructure, agriculture, agro-processing, and manufacturing to
meet the needs of export and domestic markets that will generate local
employment. NEPAD notes that Africa "undertakes to respect the global
standards for democracy, the core concepts of which include political
pluralism" and fair elections that allow people freely to choose their
leaders."' Consequently, African states promise to:
[C]onsolidate democracy and sound economic management on
the continent. Through the Programme, African leaders are
making a commitment to the African people and the world to
work together in rebuilding the continent. It is a pledge to
promote peace and stability, democracy, sound economic
management and people-centred development, and to hold each
334. Id.
335. See OAU, The New Partnership for Africa's Development (Oct. 2001), at http://
www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/nepad/nepaddoc.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2003) [hereinafter
NEPAD].
336. Dep't Foreign Aff., NEPAD Background I: Introducing the New Partnership for
Africa's Development (Feb. 2002), at http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/nepadl.htm (last modified
Feb. 28, 2002).
337. Id.
338. NEPAD, supra note 335, 79.
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other accountable in terms of the agreements outlined in the
Programme.339
In sum, NEPAD emphasizes certain success factors as imperatives to
the achievement of its set goals. These include peace, security, democ-
340racy, and good political governance, improved economic and corporate
governance, and regional cooperation and integration . The democ
racy component embodies free and fair elections as well as democratic
institutions, respect for human rights, including the rights of women and
children, as well as transparency in public management. The political
governance initiative consists of commitments by participating countries
to create or consolidate basic governance and practices and to take the
lead in supporting initiatives that foster good governance. It also institu-
tionalizes commitments through the leadership of the NEPAD to ensure
that the core values of the initiative are followed after regime changes in
participating countries.
NEPAD also develops a mechanism of peer review. Known as the
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the document will be used by
Member States of the AU "for the purpose of self-monitoring," and is
aimed "to foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that
will lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable devel-
opment and accelerated regional integration in the continent., 343 It is also
intended to enhance the capability of States, to increase the effectiveness
of aid, to stem policy reversals, and, thus, to accelerate development.
Undoubtedly, the collective action, mutual learning, and support implicit
in the APRM can have great benefits, as it will demonstrate to African
citizens and the international community that African states have the po-
litical will and commitment to abide by codes and standards that they set
for themselves.
The APRM appears to be a transitional arrangement by African
leaders, in view of the fact that the AU Act has provided for similar
mechanisms for enforcement through the PAP and the African Court of
Justice. However, as these institutions and processes are yet to be in
place, the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee
339. Id. 202; see also id. $$ 7, 43, 49, 80, 183.
340. See id. 9171.
341. See id. T$ 86-89.
342. See id. 9 1.
343. Declaration on the Implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development
(NEPAD), $ 6 OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 38th Ord. Sess.
ASS/AU/Decl.l(]) (July 8, 2002), at http://www.avmedia.at/cgi-script/csNews/news_
upload/NEPAD 2dCORE_2dDOCUMENTS_2edb.Assembly.AU.Declonlmpl
NEPAD090902. l(1).doc (last visited Sept. 4, 2002).
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decided to implement the APRM through the NEPAD. To be credible
and effective, however, the APRM must be firmly anchored in rigorous
monitoring and evaluation of performance.3"
8. The Declaration on the Principles Governing
Democratic Elections in Africa
On July 8, 2002, the OAU, at its Thirty-eighth Ordinary Session,
adopted the Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elec-
tions in Africa.345 The Declaration was the sequel to an earlier report of
the OAU Secretary-General on how to strengthen the role of the OAU in
election observation and monitoring "in order to advance the democrati-
zation process. ' '346 It acknowledged earlier instruments that had
elaborated on democracy, democratic institutions, accountability, and
participatory governance in Africa. It acknowledged the African Charter
for Popular Participation in Development, adopted in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, in July 1990, 341 which emphasized "the need to involve the
people of Africa in the spheres of economic and political governance.
34 8
It also acknowledged the Cairo Agenda for Action adopted in Cairo,
Egypt, in 1995, which stressed the necessity of ensuring good govern-
ance "through popular participation based on the respect for human
rights and dignity, free and fair elections, as well as on the respect of the
principles of freedom of the press, speech, association and con-
science. 349
The Declaration asserted that "[d]emocratic elections are the basis of
the authority of any representative government,' 350 and that "[r]egular
elections constitute a key element of the democratization process., 35' The
Declaration further states that such periodic elections-which often are
344. See Nsongurua Udombana, A Harmony or a Cacophony? The Music of Integration
in the African Union Treaty and the New Partnership for Africa's Development, 13 IND. INT'L
& CoMP. L. REV. 185 (2002) (examining the reasons for failures of past efforts at economic
and political integration in Africa and suggesting ways toward making the current efforts suc-
ceed).
345. See OAU/AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in
Africa, OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 38th Ord. Sess., A.U. Doc.
AHG/Decl. I(XXXVIII) (July 8, 2002), at http://au2003.gov.MZ/key-documentation/
oaudec.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Declaration on Principles of Democratic
Election].
346. Id. pmbl.
347. The author has been unable to access this important Charter, as well as the Cairo
Agenda for Action; thus, the Article relies on aspects cited in the Declaration on Principles of
Democratic Election, supra note 345, pmbl., para. 9.
348. Declaration on Principles of Democratic Election, supra note 345, pmbl.
349. Id. pmbl.
350. Id. 11(1 ).
351. Id. II(2).
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few and far between in Africa-are necessary in order to maintain and
promote peace, security, stability, and development, as they play "an im-
portant role in conflict prevention, management, and resolution." '352 The
Declaration, thus, lays down principles for the conduct of democratic
elections. Elections, according to the Declaration, should be conducted
"freely and fairly and under democratic constitutions and in compliance
with supportive legal instruments."' 3' Specifically, "elections should be
conducted under a system of separation of powers that ensures the inde-
pendence of the judiciary, be held at regular intervals, as provided for in
national [c]onstitutions, and be conducted by an impartial, all-inclusive,
competent, and accountable electoral institutions. 354
Member States commit themselves to take necessary measures to
ensure the implementation of these democratic principles, in accordance
with the constitutional processes in their respective countries. 55 They
also commit themselves to protecting the human and civil liberties of all
citizens, including the freedom of movement, assembly, association, ex-
pression, and campaigning, and allowing candidates and parties access to
the media during the electoral process.356 The emphasis on access to me-
dia by all stakeholders is particularly significant, as only few African
governments have liberalized ownership of the media. Incumbent gov-
ernments in Africa use government media houses, funded by taxpayers,
to launch campaigns of calumny against the opposition.
Parties to the Declaration further commit themselves to promote, in
close cooperation with civil society groups, education on democratic
principles and values;357 to take all necessary measures to prevent illegal
practices during the electoral processes;3. 8 and, significantly, to encour-
age the participation of African women in all aspects of the electoral
359process.
The Declaration reaffirmed certain rights necessary for democratic
elections, including the right of every citizen to participate in the elec-
toral processes of his country, without discrimination;36 the right to
freedom of association and assembly, including the establishment of po-
litical organizations;36' and the right of appeal to the competent judicial
352. Id. 11(3).
353. See id. $ 11(4).
354. Id.
355. Id. I 111(a).
356. Id. T 111(d).
357. Id. 111(e).
358. Id. 111(f).
359. Id. 111(j).
360. Id. IV(3).
361. Id. I IV(4)-(5).
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authorities "against all proven electoral malpractices," and to be given
fair hearing thereto.362 Conversely, the Declaration enjoins all stake-
holders in electoral processes from acts that may lead to violence 363 and
orders them to "publicly renounce the practice of granting favours to the
voting public for the purpose of influencing the outcome of elections,"
36
a veiled reference to political corruption that is the bane of Africa.
The Declaration requests the OAU (now AU) "to be fully engaged in
the strengthening of the democratization process, particularly by observ-
ing and monitoring elections" in Africa.365 Election monitoring has
become the norm the world over. The basic premise appears to be that
the criteria for what constitutes free and fair elections are internationally
agreed upon and that these criteria, being part of international human
rights standards, must be constant across national borders. International
observers are put in place to apply these criteria. Election monitoring
prevents a national government with a vested interest in the outcome of
an election from being the final arbiter of whether the election took place
in accordance with international standards.366
The international community, including major intergovernmental or-
ganizations like the U.N., the Commonwealth, and the EU, has been
involved in election observation and monitoring, again underscoring the
emergence of an international law on democratic governance. Election
monitoring has become particularly useful in Africa, because of the po-
litical atmosphere in the continent in which the state has had its
legitimacy and trustworthiness repeatedly questioned. In such situations,
election observation is needed to boost public confidence in the democ-
ratic process and to secure the fairness of the elections.367 Such observers
or monitors usually present reports and make recommendations after the
elections, which aim at identifying lapses and improving the situation in
the future, though incumbent authorities could use even such seemingly
benign reports out of context to serve their own ends.
However, like in trial observation, election monitors or observers are
usually expected to maintain neutrality and gather as much information
as possible on the conduct of the elections. This is not different in the
362. Id. IV(6).
363. Id. I IV(8).
364. Id. IV(9). Other obligations include the need for the media to maintain impartial-
ity in covering elections; for political parties to respect the impartiality of the public media;
and for the individual and political parties to recognize and respect electoral bodies burdened
with the facilitation of electoral duties. See id. 11 IV(l 1)-(13).
365. Id. I V.
366. See Communication 102/93, supra note 240, 48.
367. See generally ELECTION OBSERVATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA (Jon
Abbink & Gerti Hesseling eds., 2000).
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case of Africa. The Declaration, thus, provides guidelines for election
observers and election monitoring and commands the Secretariat, now
Commission of the AU, to issue such guidelines.368 The guidelines, which
must encompass the principles of this Declaration, should indicate "the
specific mandates and terms of reference to be determined by the par-
ticular case in question. 369
The Declaration also orders Member States to facilitate easy access
of observers and monitors to locations of electoral activities. The moni-
tors should not be hindered in the performance of their tasks.7 ° The
reason might be the fact that incumbent governments in Africa are noto-
rious for creating all imaginable obstacles-including blackmail-that
make effective monitoring difficult, if not impossible. At any rate, the
Declaration commands the Secretary-General/Chairman of the Commis-
sion to "[u]ndertake a feasibility study on the establishment ... of a
Democratization and Election Monitoring Unit that will also discharge
issues of good governance."37'
V. TOWARD SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA
The above survey demonstrates that African states have come to
terms with the reality of democratic governance. This final Part now
considers some of the superstructures that Africa must put in place to
disenchant these norms from the realm of political ideal into reality.
However, as this paper demonstrates, the norms of democratic govern-
ance in Africa are not contained in a single instrument; they are scattered
apart like the pearls of a snapped necklace. It is, thus, necessary to first
attempt a synthesis, before looking at the challenges to democratic gov-
ernance in Africa.
A. Synthesis
The following syntheses could be distilled from the discussion in the
preceding part of this Article, though the list is not exhaustive:
Democratic governance has emerged as a human right under
general and particular international law.
368. Declaration on Principles of Democratic Election, supra note 345, V(2).
369. Id.
370. Id. I V(4)
371. Id. I Vl(d).
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" This right, at least, is a species of the right of self-
determination.
" Dictatorship, in every one of its manifestations, has become
taboo in Africa.
* Democratic elections are the basis of the authority of any rep-
resentative government.
" Democracy offers the most viable route to good governance
in Africa.
" Democracy promotes peace and economic development; in
fact, the former is a sine qua non to the latter.
" Democracy promotes human rights and the rule of law; in-
deed, "the legitimate exercise of human rights does not pose
dangers to a democratic State governed by the rule of law.
' 372
" The judiciary, media, and other civil society bodies play in-
dispensable roles in democratic governance.
" Election monitoring is a norm of the democratic process.
B. Challenges to Democratic Governance in Africa
Africa must erect certain superstructures on the infrastructure of de-
mocratic governance for the structure to be stable and withstand the
storms of political crisis.-The AU must exorcise all deadweights on the
umbilical cord of the new entity, mindful that it is easy to break eggs
without making omelettes. This Section discusses some of the challenges
to democratic governance in Africa.
1. Institutions of Democratic Governance
The first major challenge to democratic governance in Africa is to
develop and strengthen competent institutions of democracy, such as the
media, judiciary, civil service, electoral systems, independent commis-
sions, and educational institutions. These and similar institutions
implement policies that are necessary to democracy and development.
372. Communications 48/90, 50/91, 52/91 and 83/98, Amnesty International, Comite
Loosli Bachelard, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and Association of Members of the
Episcopal Conference of East Africa v. Sudan, in THIRTEENTH ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT OF
THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS 1999-2000, OAU Doc.
AHG/222(XXXVI), Annex IV, [79, available at http://www.achpr.org/13thAnnual-
ActivityReport-_AHG.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2003).
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They also provide alternative voices, guaranteeing alternative mecha-
nisms to various groups to get a response from the government.
Sadly, many of these institutions have been dysfunctional in a major-
ity of African states largely due to neglect. The AU must encourage its
Member States to empower these institutions so that they can discharge
their mandates effectively-in the spirit of the AU Act.37 African states
must ensure an effective and accountable legislature, and public service
and an electoral system that ensures periodic, free, and fair elections."
These institutions and this power should be structured and distributed to
allow for significant input from ordinary citizens, and to create mecha-
nisms through which the powerful-whether political leaders,
corporations or other influential actors-can be held accountable for
their actions.375
This is where the AU should be commended for committing its
Member States to "establish impartial, all-inclusive, competent and ac-
countable national electoral bodies staffed by qualified personnel, as
well as competent legal entities including effective constitutional courts
to arbitrate in the event of disputes arising from the conduct of elec-
,,376tions. However, African leaders must also pay particular attention to
the judiciary. The courts are critical monitors of legality of governmental
actions, which no lawful government acting in good faith should seek to
evade. Their ability to examine government actions and, where neces-
sary, halt those that violate human rights or constitutional provisions, is
an essential protection for all citizens.377 When the legislative and execu-
tive organs of government become anti-citizen-as they often do in
Africa-an independent judiciary will be able to check "executive law-
373. See, e.g., AU Act, supra note 10, pmbl. 1 10 (expressing the determination of
African rulers to strengthen common institutions); cf. Durban Declaration in Tribute to
the Organization of African Unity and the Launching of the African Union, Assembly of
the AU, 1st Ord. Sess., A.U. Doc. ASS/AU/Decl.2(I) (July 10, 2002) [hereinafter Durban
Declaration], available at http://www.africa-union.org/officialdocuments/Decisions_
Declarations/Decisions_&_Declarations.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2003). Paragraph 16 of
the Durban Declaration notes that African leaders have committed themselves
[Tbo urgently establish all institutional structures to advance the agenda of the
African Union and call on all Member States to honour their political and financial
commitments and to take all the necessary actions to give unwavering support to all
the Union's initiatives aimed at promoting peace, security, stability, sustainable
development, democracy and human rights in our continent.
Id. $ 16.
374. See Promotion and Consolidation of Democracy, supra note 113, 91 2.
375. See UNDP Report 2002, supra note 63, at vi.
376. Declaration on Principles of Democratic Election, supra note 345, T 3(c).
377. See Media Rights Agenda et al v. Nigeria, supra note 35, 179.
1272 [Vol. 24:1209
Articulating the Right
lessness"' 8 and provide succor to marginalized and aggrieved citizens.
The judiciary is normally the last hope of the common person.
Regrettably, the judiciary, as yet, is not independent in many African
states. They are often understaffed and underfunded, and only remem-
bered by accident, thus placing their survival at the mercy of any
government in power. Securing an independent judiciary must be a spe-
cial project of African leaders. The judiciary must be allowed to exercise
its constitutional functions, including the power of judicial review of
executive and legislative acts, which is necessary for democratic govern-
ance. It must remain "the logical means for independent mediation when
the boundaries of legislative and executive power come into dispute." '379 It
is important, in this regard, to recall the Resolution on the Respect and the
Strengthening of the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted by the Afri-
can Commission during its Nineteenth Ordinary Session at Ouagadougou,
Burkina Faso in 1996."80 The resolution "not[ed] that justice is an integral
part of human rights and a necessary condition for democracy... [and of]
the need for African countries to have a strong and independent judiciary
[that enjoys] the confidence of the people for sustainable democracy and
development."38' The resolution called on African countries to:
" repeal all ... legislation which is inconsistent with the princi-
ples of respect of the independence of the judiciary,
especially with regard to the appointment and posting
* provide, with the assistance of the international community,
the judiciary with sufficient resources in order to enable the
legal system [sic] fulfill its function;
378. The Supreme Court of Nigeria used this phrase in reference to the executive act of
the Lagos State Government of Nigeria, when the latter disobeyed an order of the Court. See
Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu (1986) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 18) 621 (Nig.). The Court also
noted, per Obaseki J.S.C.:
Nigeria being one of the countries in the world, even in the third world, which pro-
claim loudly to follow the rule of law, there is no room for the rule of self-help by
force to operate. Once a dispute has arisen between a person and the Government or
authority and the dispute has been brought before the court, thereby invoking the judi-
cial powers of the state, it is the duty of the government to allow the law to take its
course or allow the legal and judicial process to run its full course.... The courts ex-
pect the utmost respect of the law from the government itself, which rules by the law.
Id. at 636.
379. See Leander Shaw, The Role of the Judiciary in a Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND
THE LAW 221, 225 (Bola Ajibola ed., 1991).
380. Resolution on the Respect and the Strengthening of the Independence of the Judici-
ary, in RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESOLUTIONS, supra note 122, at 33 [hereinafter Resolution
on the Judiciary].
381. Id.
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• provide judges with decent living and working conditions to
enable them to maintain their independence and realise their
full potential;
• incorporate in their legal systems, universal principles estab-
lishing the independence of the judiciary, especially with
regard to security of tenure; and
• refrain from taking any action which may threaten directly or
indirectly the independence and the security of judges and
magistrates.382
If African states summon the needed political will to put these and
other suggestions in place, then democracy will blossom like a rose.
Another institution critical to the survival of democracy in Africa is
the media and other means of communication. These play key roles in
ensuring freedom of expression, promoting the free flow of information
and ideas, and assisting people in making informed decisions.383 Sadly,
the media is still being harassed in Africa, and journalists are often arbi-
trarily arrested and detained in many African states. "Media houses
deemed critical of the establishment"311 are victimized, while there are
"inadequate legal frameworks for regulating electronic media[,] espe-
cially broadcasting ... [C]riminal and civil laws [of most African
countries still] inhibit the right to freedom of expression.""3 5 The Gambia
is one such African country where the media is operating under heavy
burdens.3 6
The AU must urge its Member States to abrogate antimedia laws,
and should also use the APRM of NEPAD to monitor compliance. More
importantly, African states should liberalize the broadcasting industry
and encourage a diverse, independent private broadcasting sector. "A
State monopoly over broadcasting is not compatible with the right to
382. Id.
383. See Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa, Afr. Comm'n,
32nd Ord. Sess., pmbl. (Oct. 2002), in RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESOLUTIONS, supra note 122,
at 86 [hereinafter Declaration on Principles of Freedom of Expression].
384. Resolution on Freedom of Expression, in RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESOLUTIONS,
supra note 122, at 70 [hereinafter Resolution on Freedom of Expression].
385. Id.
386. See, e.g., Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Gambia: Growing Clampdown on Freedom of
Expression (Aug. 7, 2002), at http://www.amnesty.org/library/engindex (last visited Sept. 4,
2003) ("expressing concern at increasing attacks on freedom of expression in the Gambia follow-
ing the recent arrests of three journalists [Pa Ousman Darboe, Alhaji Yoro Jallo, and Guy-Patrick
Massaloko] solely on the grounds of their legitimate professional activities").
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freedom of expression" and democratization. Experience has shown
that most government-owned media are usually mouthpieces of the
government in power, rather than services to the collective interest of the
citizenry. It is, in this regard, necessary that, "[s]tate and government
controlled broadcasters should be transformed into public service
broadcasters, accountable to the public through the legislature rather
than the government. '388
The best way to achieve democratization is for the state to strengthen
the civil society-"that silver bullet that helps all societies to govern bet-
ter."389 Government actions in the past have been geared toward winning
the civil society, or weakening it. It is hoped that the AU will collaborate
with the civil society to bring about positive political and economic
transformation in the continent, in the spirit of the AU Act.390
The civil society-"defined as comprising those associational bodies
between the personal and the State" 39'-must, itself, act as a catalyst in
bringing about the realization of democratic governance in Africa. This392
group is indispensable for democracy; it is the force for societal resis-
tance to state excesses, and the centerpiece-organizationally, materially,
and ideologically-of the civil movements and protests for reform and
change.393 As the Interim Chairman of the AU Commission admits, "[t]he
387. Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa, in RECOMMENDATIONS
AND RESOLUTIONS, supra note 122, at 86, 88. This declaration also calls for the promotion of com-
munity broadcasting, "given its potential to broaden access by poor and rural communities to the
airwaves." Id.
388. Id.
389. Kuldeep Mathur, Good Governance State and Democracy, Paper Presented at the Con-
ference on Beyond the Post Washington Consensus: Governance and the Public Domain In
Contrasting Economies-The Cases of India and Canada 2 (Feb. 12-14, 2001), at
http://www.robarts.yorku.ca/pdf/mathur-delhi.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2003) (setting out the chal-
lenges that face India in strengthening civil societies and limiting the role of the state, so that the
former can have greater spaces to act).
390. See AU Act, supra note 10, pmbl. (expressing the need for African governments "to
build a partnership between governments and all segments of civil society, in particular women,
youth and the private sector in order to strengthen solidarity and cohesion among [the] peoples").
391. Paul Gifford, Book Review, 30 J. RELIGION IN AFR. 494, 495 (2000) (reviewing CIVIL
SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES (Nelson Kasfir ed., 1998)).
392. In the context of education, for example, the civil society will include all NGOs and non-
profit associations involved in education. It will embrace groups such as campaign networks,
teacher unions and religious organizations, community associations and research networks, parents'
associations and professional bodies, student organizations, social movements, and others.
393. Michael Bratton, Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa, 41
WORLD POL. 407 (1989). See generally CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE POLITICAL IMAGINATION IN
AFRICA: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES (John L. Comaroff & Jean Comaroff eds., 1999) (revealing that it
is important to stress that civil society could be multi-faceted in its many guises, inherently exclusive
and egalitarian and susceptible to high-handed and parochial application in unfamiliar territory);
Jean-Frangois Bayart, Civil Society in Africa, in POLITICAL DOMINATION IN AFRICA: REFLECTIONS
ON THE LIMITS OF POWER 109 (Patrick Chabal ed., 1986) (discussing notions of the State and civil
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rule of law, governmental accountability, peace and security are key to
the social, economic and political development of Africa. All of these
require, as a necessary condition for their success, a strong and autono-
mous civil society.
'394
The civil society should work to galvanize the continent's citizens
who have been beaten into submission by years of repression and op-
pression. It should resist the desperate consolidation of power that has
become the hallmark of African politics and should check other forms
of power manifestations and leadership vanities in the continent. It
should work to ensure that the unlimited power of the majority, which
is a concomitant of democracy, does not degenerate into the tyranny of
the majority. Thus, while the political class dictates the tune of the po-
litical music, the civil society should, at least, amplify the melody-for
greater democracy, accountability, and transparency.
2. Poverty and Illiteracy
Africa is plagued by poverty "on a scale never known in earlier
times, or even dreamed of."'395 There are serious deprivations in many
aspects of life, as hundreds of millions of people live in absolute pov-
erty. 96 Bad weather, coupled with bad leaders,97 has left many Africans
society as they relate to political development in Africa); Naomi Chazen, State and Society in
Africa: Images and Challenges, in THE PRECARIOUS BALANCE: STATE AND SOCIETY IN AFRICA 325
(Donald Rothchild & Naomi Chazen eds., 1988) (discussing the state's problems, societal
happenings, political changes, and the challenges faced by the states and society in Africa);
Augustine lkelegbe, The Perverse Manifestation of Civil Society: Evidence from Nigeria, 39 J. MOD.
AFR. STUD. 1, 2 (2001) (discussing "the wave of popular protests ... that has resulted in
democratization since the early 1990s" and the romanticism associated with these movements).
394. Amara Essy, Statement at the Opening of the Second OAU-Civil Society Conference
on Developing Partnership Between the OAU and African Civil Society Organizations (June 11,
2002), at http://www.africa-union.org/Official-documents/Speeches &_Statements/Speeches &.
Statements.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2003). Amara Essy also asserts that the "role of civil society
organizations as grassroots agents of mobilization for the processes of economic development [has
been] widely acknowledged [,though] their role in the areas of peace, security and stability [is] ...
still highly contested. Id.
395. See DAVIDSON, supra note 28, at 9.
396. Absolute poverty, also known as extreme poverty, is defined as the "lack of income nec-
essary to satisfy basic food needs-usually defined on the basis of minimum calorie requirements.'
UN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, OVERCOMING HUMAN POVERTY at 20, U.N.
Sales No. E. 00.1I.B.2 (2000), available at http://www.undp.org/povertyreport/ENGLISH/
ARchap I.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2003). It is to be contrasted with relative or overall poverty, which
is the "lack of income necessary to satisfy essential non-food needs, such as clothing, energy and
shelter-as well as food needs." Id. Numerically, there were 1.5 billion persons living in absolute
poverty at the dawn of the new millennium. See Report of the UN Secretary General on Implemen-
tation of the First United Nations Decade for the Eradication of Poverty (1997-2000), U.N. GAOR,
54th Sess., Agenda Item 105, at T15, U.N. Doc. A/54/316 (1999).
397. See, e.g., U.N. FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORG., GLOBAL INFORMATION AND EARLY
WARNING SYSTEM ON FOOD AND AGRICULTURE: FOOD SUPPLY SITUATION AND CROP PROSPECTS
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hungry. A 2002 report "estimates that the proportion of the population
living on less than US $1 a day in the least developed countries of Africa
has increased continuously since 1965-1969, rising from an average of
55.8 percent in those years to 64.9 percent in 1995-1999."' 9' NEAPD
corroborates this gloomy picture, pointing out that
340 million Africans, or half the population, live on less than
one dollar per day. The mortality rate of children under five
years of age is 140 per 1000, and life expectancy at birth is only
54 years. Only 58 percent of the population [has] access to safe
water[, while] the rate of illiteracy for people over 15 is 41 per-
cent. There are only 18 mainline telephones per 1000 people in
Africa, compared with 146 for the world ... and 567 for high-
income countries.399
It is submitted that poverty is a great hindrance to democracy and the
enjoyment of human rights. Poverty leaves many people susceptible to
manipulations by several forces and interests. Democracy will not thrive
in instability or under conditions of excruciating and humiliating pov-
erty. As Christopher Weeramantry rightly observes, "[t]he human rights
dialogue breaks down completely if the listener suffers from an empty
stomach or the preacher has had any hand in producing it."4 ° It is true
that elections are evidence of popular sovereignty and the basis for inter-
national endorsement of the elected government; but free elections are
only one side of the coin. A hungry person-who usually is also an an-
gry person--cannot appreciate the aesthetics of a ballot box or, for that
matter, the significance of his ballot.4°' Such a person thinks about food,
not freedom.
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, at ii (Dec. 2002), available at http://www.fao.org/giews (last visited
Sept. 4, 2003) (reporting that twenty-five countries face food emergencies in sub-Saharan Africa,
mainly due to drought, civil strife and internally displaced persons). The countries listed are
Angola, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mauritania, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia,
and Zimbabwe.
398. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: FROM
ADJUSTMENT TO POVERTY REDUCTION: WHAT IS NEW? at 2, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/
GDS/AFRICA/2, U.N. Sales No. E.02-11-D.18 (2002).
399. See NEPAD, supra note 335, 1 4.
400. CHRISTOPHER G. WEERAMANTRY, JUSTICE WITHOUT FRONTIERS: FURTHERING
HUMAN RIGHTS 122 (1997); see also Claude Ake, The African Context of Human Rights,
lst/2nd Quarters AFR. TODAY 5 (1987) (arguing that "the right to peaceful assembly, free
speech and thought, fair trial, etc.... appeal to people with a full stomach.").
401. See The Third World, supra note 229, at 785. This article also argues that
"[i]nternational cooperation must bring to bear a concerted effort to tackle the obstacles to
democracy." Id.
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Therefore, the first challenge to democratic governance in Africa is
to address the problem of hunger and illiteracy, bearing in mind, that
"literacy, especially functional literacy and adequate education,
represents an indispensable element for the development and harnessing
of science, technology, and human resources for economic and social
progress outside of. '402 The irony is that most constitutions in Africa
require the possession of a primary or secondary certificate as a basic
•• 401
condition for standing for elected positions. Yet, most African
constitutions make economic, social, and cultural rights, including the
right to education, nonjusticiable.4  There are a few exceptions, such as
South Africa4 5 and Algeria,4° but the general rule in many African
countries is that citizens have the right to vote, but not to be voted for, by
reason of illiteracy and such other inhibiting factors. This, undoubtedly,
is a violation of democratic rights.
An economic crusade to eradicate poverty and illiteracy in Africa
should be the urgent vision of development of the AU. These needs are
as important as the current crusade to eradicate polio, malaria, and
HIV/AIDS in Africa. The progress of a nation is not judged by its
military strength but by how many people have food on their table, clean
water, and access to heath care facilities. Since the proper study of
shepherds is the sheep, not other shepherds, the good governance goals
of NEPAD and other such projects should aim primarily at ensuring a
better life for present and future generations of Africans. African leaders
must bend their strength to fulfill the citizens' ends.
402. Draft Resolution on Education for All, U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 52d Sess., Agenda
Item 102, at pmbl., 16, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/52/L. I1/Rev. 1 (1997). This document recognizes the
need for a "more forceful and concerted action at national and international levels to achieve
the goal of education for all" because of "emerging and continuing" problems in this area. Id.
pmbl. $ 10. This document also "appeals to all Governments to step up ... efforts [toward]
eradicat[ing] illiteracy and to direct education towards the full development of the human
personality and ... the strengthening of respect for all human rights and fundamental free-
doms." Id. T 4. See also A U.N. Literary Decade: Education for All, G.A. Res. 54/122, U.N.
GAOR, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 106, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/Res/54/122 (2000) ("Urging interna-
tional organizations and NGOs, to promote the right to education for all and to create
conditions for all for learning throughout life").
403. See generally NiG. CONST. (1999), available at http://www.nigeria-law.org/
ConstitutionOtTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2003).
404. See, e.g., id. art. 6(6)(c).
405. See S. AFR. CONST. art. 29 (1997), at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/
sf00000_.html (last modified Dec. 8, 2002) (providing for the right to education, "which the
state, through reasonable measures, must make progressively available and accessible").
406. See ALG. CONST. art. 53 (1996), available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/
agOOOOO_.html (last modified Dec. 8, 2002) (providing for the right to education and requiring
the State to ensure that "equal access to education and professional training").
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The alleviation of poverty depends on economic growth, which, in
turn, depends on sound economic policies and management. African
governments should seek to promote macroeconomic stability and
higher growth in their economic policies, as well as the improvement ofthe elivry o socal • 407
the delivery of social services. The main themes of economic policy in
Africa should include both the "creati[on of] an enabling environment
for producers, investors, and employers, and the improv[ement of] gov-
ernance and public finances.,,40 8 Ghana appears to be making progress in
this regard, as the President John Kufour's government is "luring [inves-
tors] into new sectors [that are] capable of diversifying the export base
[of the country]. This has become possible because of the government's
pro-business legislation [and] privatization, ' 4° which is what good gov-
ernance is all about.40
African governments must stop using the problem of economic
underdevelopment as an alibi for their low scorecard in meeting the
basic needs of their people. This argument is now singularly flaccid and
unconvincing. The truth is "that any State-no matter how poor-can
cover the basic needs of its people, provided that it is properly managed
and governed., 41' As Botswana's economic success demonstrates, good
governance is critical to Africa's renaissance and development.
407. EcON. COMM'N FOR AFR., ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA 2002: TRACKING PER-
FORMANCE AND PROGRESS 40 (2002) [hereinafter ECA REPORT 2002] (indicating that
"economic policies in Africa in 2000-01 sought to promote macroeconomic stability and
higher growth and to improve the delivery of social services").
408. Id.
409. Id. at 43. This report also indicates that:
Sound fiscal management ... has achieved impressive results [in Ghana, as the] ...
inflation rate dropped from 41% in January 2001 to 25% in August. [Similarly, i]n
the first half of 2001 the cedi depreciated by 38%, relative to the U.S. dollar, but in
the second half of the year, depreciation was just 2.5% ... The primary fiscal bal-
ance recorded a surplus (1.9 percent of GDP) for the first time since 1997 ... [By
the end of 2001, according to the report,] a 2.6 trillion cedi ($350 million) gap in
foreign exchange requirements was closed ... and debt service was cut by 2.8 tril-
lion cedi ($375 million) under the HIPC initiative. [Finally,] GDP growth-which
had been expected to slow because of high inflation, severe imbalances in fiscal and
external accounts, and the tight monetary policy announced in March 2001-
actually improved, rising 3.5% in 2001 compared with 2.0% in 2000.
Id.
410. See Reif, supra note I11, at 16-17.
411. Germain Baricako, The African Charter and the African Commission on Human
and Peoples' Rights: A Mandate to Promote and Protect Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
in Africa, in INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, REPORT OF A REGIONAL SEMINAR ON ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 45, 60 (1998); Report of the Secretariat, U.N. GAOR World
Conference on Human Rights, Preparatory Comm., 4th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 6,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/PC/73 (1993).
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Botswana not only has transparency in decision making but also offers
an example of "input that continually recharges the batteries of
government, and that the doors of government are open. 41 2 This partially
explains why a country that only escaped from the list of the Least
Developed Countries (LDCs)413 in 1994 is currently the world's number
one producer of diamonds by value, with production worth US $1.9
billion at an average price per carat of US $97 4
Botswana's development record stands in sharp contrast to that of
most African countries.4 " For example:
With a population of about a million people in the 1960s, [Bot-
swana] sustained an average per capita economic growth rate of
ten percent from 1960 to 1980, exceeding that of South Korea or
Hong Kong. While per capita income private consumption
throughout Sub-Saharan Africa declined at 2.1 percent a year,
from 1980 to 1997, it increased in Botswana at 2.3 percent ...
the institutional capacity of African States in general to reverse
underdevelopment has 'vanished' in the last twenty years, but
the capacity of the public sector in Botswana has improved con-
siderably.
416
412. KPUNDEH, supra note 31, at 47 (noting also that "elections [in Botswana] have been
relatively honest, the government has, in fact, kept its promises by and large, and has remained
popular; and the opposition continues to act as a loyal opposition, believing sincerely in the
possibility of alternation.").
413. See Arghyrios A. Fatouros, Developing States, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INT'L
LAW 1017, 1019 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000). The importance of this classification was
stressed:
[As] far back as 1964, in the Final Act of the UNCTAD I [United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development] Since then, the [UN] General Assembly, through
... [its] resolutions, has [regularly] identified ... countries [falling within the] ...
category [of LDCs,] ... on the basis of three tests: very low per capita GNP, very
low literacy rate, and low contribution of manufacturing to the gross domestic
product (GDP).
Id. In 1981, the U.N. organized a Conference on LDCs in Paris, where it "adopted a Substan-
tial New Program of Action for the 1980s, which lists a series of international measures to
assist [the] poorest of the poor countries." Id. Similarly, "[t]he overwhelming majority of de-
veloping countries are ... given preferential treatment by all developed countries, [though] a
few [sitates benefit from special
Id.
414. See James Brew, Confidence Grows in the Regional Economy, APR. Topics, Jan.-
Mar. 2000, at 21. World production is worth US$6.6 billion.
415. Clements, supra note 22, at 303.
416. Id.
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Whatever may be the strength of the dependency theory,47 it may no
longer be fashionable for African states to use it as an alibi for its current
economic meltdown. To take a non-African case study: Singapore was a
former colony of Britain whose citizens were poor and a heterogeneous
mix of Chinese, Malay, and Indians, living in an overpopulated land.
Largely because of good governance, Singapore today enjoys a vibrant
economy, in what might be regarded as "the Singapore miracle.' 4 8
Singapore's per capita income is one of the highest in the world. It
enjoys equity among its citizens, as "the top twenty percent of
households earn 9.6 times as much as the lowest twenty percent.'4 '9 Its
health care services are sound; housing is adequate; literacy is high, as
its educational opportunities are excellent; and unemployment is almost
nonexistent. It is even estimated that more than 90 percent of
420Singaporeans own their own homes.
African countries should stop making excuses; they should get their
acts together, and move on. They should stop deceiving the citizens, for
the latter are led to believe a lie only when they do not see through the
eye. The final cause of democracy must be the welfare of society. The
rule that misses its aim cannot permanently justify its existence. Unless
democracy produces prosperity in Africa in the short run, it will lose its
legitimacy in the long run.
3. Corruption
Corruption is endemic in Africa and is the defining feature of its
governance. It has made so many headlines in African cities such that the
citizens are growing weary of bad news, and feel powerless in relation to
the monster. Government institutions in Africa have become breeding
grounds of paralysis and patronage, turning a blind eye to corrupt
practices. Corruption, especially political corruption, is antithetical to
democracy, as it denies the state of resources needed to strengthen the
institutions of democracy-like the judiciary. It denies the state of
resources needed to bring about democratic dividends, like good roads,
communication, health facilities, and water. It denies the state of
417. The dependency theory contends that a wide range of foreign forces, including the
hegemonic powers and international financial institutions, are decisive factors in bringing
about policy changes in least developed countries. It states that the core countries tend to exert
pressure on the peripheral States to liberalize and internationalize their economies when de-
pendency increases. See J.D. Pedersen, Explaining Economic Liberalization in India: State
and Society Perspectives, 28 WORLD DEV. 265 (2000).
418. See TOMMY KOH, Explaining the Singapore Miracle, in THE QUEST FOR WORLD
ORDER: PERSPECTIVES OF A PRAGMATIC IDEALIST 204 (Amitav Acharya ed., 1998).
419. Id. at 207.
420. Id. at 206.
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resources needed to empower the citizens-especially women-through
education and other means necessary to play useful roles in the
democratic project. Corruption brings about moral decay in society and
weakens that vital moral fiber that society needs for survival.
The democratization of the continent will be a mirage unless the AU
wages a concerted crusade against corruption. The AU must move from
being a thermometer that records the ideas and principles of popular
opinion to a thermostat that transforms the mores of society. It is, of
course, gratifying that the body is already addressing the problem of cor-
ruption at the continental level. In July 2003, the AU Ministers, at its
Conference held in Maputo, adopted the African Union Convention on
Preventing and Combating Corruption. 42 ' The convention contains provi-
sions that will guarantee access to information and the participation of
civil society and the media in the monitoring process. Among others, it
"[p]roscribe[s] the use of funds acquired through illegal and corrupt
practices to finance political parties,' '4 ' and orders states to adopt legisla-
tive measures to facilitate the repatriation of the proceeds of
423
corruption.
These are bold and imaginative moves to tackle the problem of cor-
ruption in Africa; but more must be done, and more quickly, for the rot is
deep and continuous.
4. Social Justice in Plural States
It is not news that Africa is plagued by the twin problems of sharp
cleavages of various kinds and by political instability. What is news is
the idea that it is possible to achieve democratic governments in plural
societies-defined as a society that is divided by "segmental cleav-
ages.''414 That it is difficult has long been established, reaching back to
Aristotle's adage that "A state aims at being, as far as it can be, a society
composed of equals and peers."425 Admittedly, it is much easier to secure
421. Decision on the Draft Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption, AU
Assembly, 2d Ord. Sess., A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU. Dec. 27(11) (2003).
422. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption,
July 11, 2003, at art. 10(a) [hereinafter Corruption Convention], at http://
www. africa-union.org/Officialdocuments/Treaties_ Conventions_ Protocols/Treaties_
Conventions_&Protocols.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2003).
423. Id. art. 16(l)(c).
424. HARRY ECKSTEIN, DIVISION AND COHESION IN DEMOCRACY: A STUDY OF NORWAY
34 (1966) (writing that a "segmental cleavage" exists "where political divisions follow very
closely, and especially concern, lines of objective social differentiation, especially those par-
ticularly salient in a society"); LIJPHART, supra note 185, at 4 ("A further characteristic [of a
plural society] is that political parties, interest groups, media of communication, schools, and
voluntary associations tend to be organized along the lines of segmental cleavages.").
425. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 181 (Ernest Barker trans., 1958).
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stable democracies in societies with "social homogeneity and political
consensus;, 426 but it is not impossible to achieve the same in plural socie-
ties. This could be attained, partly, through what Arend Lijphart calls
"consociational democracy," by which he means that, "the centrifugal
tendencies inherent in a plural society are counteracted by the coopera-
tive attitudes and behavior of the leaders of the different segments of the
population. 427
African states must promote pluralism, protect human rights, and
maximize the participation of individuals in decision-making. Democ-
racy can thrive in plural societies where there is social justice, where the
government in power seeks to advance the individual and collective
well-being of all citizens. Democracy cannot thrive under exclusivism,
where double standards or a "divide and rule" strategy are instruments of
government policy. In such an environment, the motto will be: "everyone
to himself and God for all." That is bad for the democratic project, in
particular, and the society in general.
Whatever structures and processes African states struggle to put in
place, democratic governance must recognize the basic principles of in-
clusion, participation, freedom, justice, and equity for all, since citizens
will not compromise any of these principles under any circumstances.
Similarly, "free and fair" election is meaningless so long as it does not
428
engage the broader problems of democracy, equality, and justice.
When a state fails to offer its people sanctuary, hope, confidence, and,
above all, a sense of belonging, questions will necessarily be raised
about the viability of such a state.
5. Aid Dependency and Foreign Debts
Africa's attempt at democratization will only lead to good govern-
ance and prosperity "when Africans learn to neutralize the harm that the
unholy trinity of loans, aid and debt has done to them., 42 9 The reason is
that "the more States depend on unearned income, the less accountable
they will be towards their citizens and the less capacity they will pos-
sess. 4 30 This is a very elementary principle, and it is baffling that African
426. LIJPHART, supra note 185, at 1 (examining "consociational democracy" and con-
cluding that it is possible "to achieve and maintain stable democratic government in a plural
society").
427. Id.
428. See ELECTION OBSERVATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA, supra note 367, at
8.
429. Mammo Muchie, Wanted, African Monetary Union, NEW AiR., Apr. 2002, at 32.
430. See Kjaer, supra note 115 (defining 'unearned income' to mean "the kind of reve-
nue that comes easy, like, for instance, donor grants").
1283Summer 20031
Michigan Journal of International Law
states appear not to have grasped it. States tend to be accountable to-
wards their main source of income. In the case of African nations, their
main sources of income are the international donor communities. "The
very presence of external actors demanding evaluations of programs,
regular reports and accounts for moneys given, put a strain on the limited
capacity that these states possess and directs accountability outwards
instead of inwards. 4 3' This is neocolonialism through and through. For
African states to earn income, they must build organizational apparatuses
to extract resources from the population that will enable them, in return,
to provide basic services and infrastructures.
Paradoxically, the prospects of democratization in Africa lie not only
in the careful strategies of African governments, but also in the good will
of the international community. Conditioned aid could also be detrimen-
tal to the growth of democracy. 4" Besides, there is need for
democratization of the institutions of global governance-the WTO,
World Bank and IMF-in view of the impact of globalization on the re-
alization of democracy, or the human rights consequences of the form of
democracy being promoted.433 Elections alone are not sufficient.
By far, the greatest threat to the democratic project in Africa is the
debt burden. Not surprisingly, it has remained in the forefront of debates
on Africa's political and economic renaissance. The debt burden,
imposed on African citizens by their inept governments in collaboration
with multilateral corporations and international financial institutions, is
one of the greatest challenges to democratic governance in Africa. More
than half of African countries are classified as Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC). 4 4 For many African countries, it takes more than half
of their Gross National Product (GNP) to service their debt. This heavy
debt burden and debt-servicing obligation has debilitated the
socioeconomic structure of many African countries.435 It has also
431. See id.
432. See, e.g., JOAN M. NELSON & STEPHANIE EGLINTON, ENCOURAGING DEMOCRACY:
WHAT ROLE FOR CONDITIONED AID? (1992).
433. See Evans, supra note 130, at 632.
434. These include: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chad, DR Congo, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal,
Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia. See HIPC Initiative: Status of Country
Cases Considered Under the Initiative (Dec. 2001), at http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/
progress-to-date/Status-tableDecember.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2003).
435. See Frank X. Njenga, The African Debt Problem: Legal and Institutional Dimen-
sions, 2 AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 95 (1994).
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constrained Africa's prospects for economic growth,436 as well as its
ability to fulfill socioeconomic and cultural rights to its citizens.
The international financial institutions must be more responsive and
more responsible. Why are billions of U.S. dollars poured into Africa
yearly while the continent continues to languish in poverty and underde-
velopment? The simple answer is that Africa's development trajectory
has been deflected by the self-serving colossus known as the "loan and
aid industrial complex." '437 The IMF and World Bank may have done
more to compound Africa's economic and political crisis than have con-
flicts.
The international community, particularly the international financial
institutions, must take the issue of debt relief and cancellation seriously,
since underdevelopment is a great hindrance to democracy.438 The im-
mense structural inequalities that define our world must be torn down. In
particular, the global economic injustice of unpayable and unjust debts
must be addressed, so that everyone, including African citizens, can
reach their full potential. Africans have a moral right to freedom from
harassment by international creditors; and that right, it is submitted, is a
major component of the right to democratic governance.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article attempts to articulate the right to democratic governance
in Africa within the context of the global discourse on this emergent
generation of rights. It shows, from the prism of the U.N.- and regional-
inspired instruments, how the norm on democratic governance has
grown gradually but graphically in the continent. It is, of course, certain
that both the U.N. and AU have not said the last words on this emergent
right, in terms of standard setting. However, the greatest challenge to
democratic governance is how to implement the existing norms,
particularly as Africa has no existent uniform superstructures for their
implementation.
436. See Yaounde Declaration, supra note 134, 10; cf U.N. Programme of Action for
African Economic Recovery and Development 1986-1990, G.A. Res. S-13/2, U.N. GAOR,
13th Special Sess., Agenda Item 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-13/2 (1996) [hereinafter U.N.
Programme of Action for Africa]. See generally HOWARD STEIN, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AND THE ANATOMY OF CRISIS IN AFRICA: FROM COLONIALISM THROUGH STRUCTURAL
ADJUSTMENT (2001); GILES MOHAN ET AL., STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT: THEORY, PRACTICE
AND IMPACTS (2000) (providing a summary of leftist critiques of structural adjustment).
437. See Muchie, supra note 429, at 32.
438. See The Third World, supra note 229, at 785 (arguing that "[tlhe West must recog-
nize that underdeveloped societies are not likely to become democratic").
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This Article identifies the challenges to democratization in Africa
and suggests remedial actions-such as erecting and strengthening the
institutional structures for democratic governance and working to reduce
poverty and illiteracy-since these are the possible routes toward instill-
ing meaning in the idyllic words of global and regional instruments.
There are no rules of architecture for a castle in the clouds. The AU must
move from dreaming to doing, and must strive to make the right to de-
mocratic governance real in Africa. African nations in general, must
allow democracy and the rule of law to blossom, since the absence of the
rule of law implies the presence of rule by law. 43'9 Fundamental chal-
lenges at the heart of development require not only leadership and
resources, but a legal response as well; and a key barometer of Africa's
progress will be the promotion of, and respect for, the rule of law.
Similarly, economic, social, cultural, and political transformations are
taking place daily in the continent, and a healthy degree of press freedom
and political participation could help to absolve the strains of such
wrenching changes.44 At any rate, freedom and a genuine and meaning-
ful political participation are among the tools for democracy.
Since Africans themselves are agents of sustainable democracy, they
must never forget that the military remains the most formidable threat to
democracy in Africa. They must watch out for such self-seeking and cor-
rupt adventurers seeking to reap where they do not sow and must rise up
and shout with one voice: "Never again!" to despotism, tyranny, and
mismanagement of African economies. Despotism is almost always the
end of societies that have been highly democratic. Africans must not al-
low the dying dynasty of dictators to resurrect in the continent. They
must particularly resist trends toward omnipotence by incumbent rulers;
and they should do so through nonviolent disobedience, including sit-ins,
strikes, and demonstrations-the kind that the international community
has witnessed, and is witnessing, in the South American countries of
Haiti, Argentina and Venezuela. Such actions will send clear messages to
439. The rule of law consists of certain core elements, such as "(1) a set of rules that are
known in advance; (2) as set of rules that are in force; (3) the existence of mechanisms to
ensure application of the rules; (4) the resolution of conflicts through an independent judiciary
or through arbitration; and (5) known procedures of amending the rules when they no longer
serve their purpose. See NRC SUMMARY, supra note 114, at 4-5. See generally The Rule of
Law, supra note 37.
440. Cf Resolution on Freedom of Expression, supra note 384, pmbl. (noting that "free-
dom of expression is a potent and indispensable instrument for the creation and maintenance
of a democratic society and the consolidation of development"); Declaration on Principles of
Freedom of Expression, supra note 383, pmbl. (noting that "respect for freedom of expres-
sion, as well as the right of access to information held by public bodies and companies, will
lead to greater public transparency and accountability, as well as to good governance and the
strengthening of democracy").
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prospective military adventurers that the era of military rule is over, "in
the interest of the African image, progress, and development, and for the
creation of an environment in which human rights values may flour-
ish." '
Africans must never forget that democracy, for all intents and
purposes, is subversive of extant conventional social and political orders
and relations. They must work to reconstruct such orders, bearing in
mind that there are many imperfect democracies in the continent, and
that the process of state building is far from complete. Since democracy
itself is a goal as well as a process, there has to be continuous
consultation, construction, and reconstruction to meet changing needs
and opinions. As a Ghanaian taxi driver is reported to have said:
"[g]ovemment is like a T-shirt. If you don't change it from time to time,
it begins to stink."" 2
The process of democratic reconstruction certainly will not be sim-
ple, since the natural person is resistant to change and the oppressor does
not usually give freedom and, a fortiori, democracy, voluntarily. The
oppressed Africans must demand freedom, which is a cherished ideal.
This struggle for change requires courage, for where courage is lacking,
no other virtue can survive except by accident. Of course, the resolution
to engineer change will sometimes relax, and diligence will sometimes
be interrupted; but no accidental surprise or deviation, whether short or
long, should dispose Africans to despondency. This is a life and death
struggle; and, indeed, several Africans-including Nigeria's M.K.O.
Abiola443-have died in defense of democracy. Too much is at stake for
silence to be anyone's option.
441. Resolution on the Military, supra note 122, 4.
442. A Ghanaian taxi driver commenting on recent elections in his country, in Barkan,
supra note 46, at 72.
443. Chief M.K.O. Abiola was the undeclared winner of the June 12, 1993 presidential
election in Nigeria, the election having been annulled by General Babangida. Chief Abiola
was later incarcerated by General Abacha for insisting on his mandate, and died in detention
in 1998.
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